The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge by Leonard, David P.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 81 | Issue 1 Article 3
2002
The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to
Prove Knowledge
David P. Leonard
Loyola Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 Neb. L. Rev. (2002)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol81/iss1/3
David P. Leonard*
The Use of Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence to Prove Knowledge
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 116
II. Admissibility to Prove Knowledge as Part of a Mental
State Required for a Crime or Civil Claim ............. 121
A. Fact Patterns in Which Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct to Prove Knowledge on the Occasion in
Question Can Be Justified ......................... 124
B. Fact Patterns That Raise Greater Dangers of Jury
Misuse of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence ......... 136
1. In general ..................................... 140
2. Illustration: admissibility to rebut a "mere
presence" defense .............................. 144
3. Illustration: admissibility to prove unlawful
intent in prosecutions for possession of illegal
drugs with intent to distribute ................. 148
C. Fact Patterns in Which the Relevance of the
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Depends on
"Doctrine of Chances" Reasoning ................... 160
III. Admissibility to Prove Knowledge as Circumstantial
Evidence of an Ultimate Fact Other than a Required
State of M ind ......................................... 165
IV . Conclusion ............................................ 169
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
The substance of this Article will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming book,
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CONDUCT AND SIMILAR EVENTS, a volume of the treatise THE
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
What did the President know, and when did he first know it?1
I. INTRODUCTION
In public and private affairs alike, it is frequently important and
sometimes essential to determine whether a person knew a certain
fact at a particular time. During the Watergate scandal, the key ques-
tion was what President Nixon knew and when he came into posses-
sion of that knowledge. Knowledge was an important issue during the
Congressional investigations into the Iran-Contra scandal as well. 2
As people attempt to assess blame for the collapse of the giant energy
company Enron, they are asking the same question.3 In civil actions
for fraud or prosecution for possession of stolen goods or sale of illegal
narcotics, conviction requires proof of knowledge. From the mundane
drug case to the huge corporate failure and to matters of the highest
national interest, the question of knowledge looms large.
There is no dispute about the relevance of a person's knowledge to
the resolution of essential issues in cases before the courts. Because
knowledge must always be proven circumstantially, the difficult ques-
tion concerns the type of evidence that may be used to establish this
fact. When a party seeks to establish a person's knowledge by proof of
other misconduct in which she has engaged, there is a risk that the
fact-finder will employ a forbidden character-based inference against
her. Whether the evidence will be admissible will depend in the first
instance on whether it is relevant on a sufficiently compelling non-
character basis. That determination, in turn, implicates a long-stand-
ing rule of evidence law.
No rule of evidence has been litigated as frequently, and with as
much inconsistency in outcome, as the "other crimes, wrongs, or acts"
rule. As embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the rule
provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
1. Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings on S. Res. 60 Before the Sen-
ate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. at
3088 (1973) (statement of Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr.).
2. See, e.g., Joint Hearings Before the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, at 29(1987) (introductory statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch: "In my mind, there are
two questions for us to try to answer: What did the President know? And where
did the money go? Almost everything else centers on those two questions.").3. See, e.g., Rone Tempest & Richard Simon, The Fall of Enron: Enron's Lay Faces
Capitol Hill Hot Seat Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at A20 ("When Kenneth
L. Lay appears before Congress on Monday, his interrogators are expected to pur-
sue a familiar theme: What did he know and when did he know it?").
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accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
4
The rule's basic principle is relatively straightforward. The first sen-
tence is redundant, essentially repeating the fundamental rule that
character evidence may not be offered to prove that the individual ac-
ted in accordance with her character on a specific occasion. 5 Rule
404(b) governs a sub-category of such evidence: other crimes, wrongs,
or acts. Evidence of such conduct ("uncharged misconduct evidence")
6
may not be offered to prove that the actor possesses a particular char-
acter trait, and that she acted in accordance with that character trait
at the relevant time.
As the second sentence of the rule makes clear, however, other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are only inadmissible if the way the proponent
is using the evidence requires an inference of character at any point in
the chain of inferences leading from the evidence to the conclusion
sought to be proved. If the evidence is relevant to the action in any
way that does not require an inference concerning the actor's charac-
ter, it is potentially admissible. The rule contains a non-exclusive list
of such purposes. Uncharged misconduct evidence used in this way is
not automatically admissible. As the Supreme Court has explained,
7
even if the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, the court may ex-
clude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.8 And even when the court admits the evidence, the
party against whom it is offered is entitled to a limiting instruction
informing the jury "that the ... evidence is to be considered only for
the proper purpose for which it was admitted."9
4. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The basic substance of the rule has been adopted in every
American jurisdiction. See 6 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, Table of State and
Military Adaptations, at T-34 to T-39 (2d ed. Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., eds.
2001).
5. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion . . ").
6. For simplicity, I will refer to "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" evidence as "un-
charged misconduct evidence." The term "uncharged misconduct" appears to
have been coined by Professor Imwinkelried. See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (Rev. ed. 1998). "Uncharged misconduct" re-
fers to crimes, wrongs, or acts of a person other than the ones that form the basis
of the charge or claim now before the court. They are thus "uncharged" in the
current case.
7. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
8. Id. at 691.
9. Id. at 691-92. The Supreme Court has recently affirmed its faith in the efficacy of
jury instructions. In Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000), a capital murder
case, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that the jury was not adequately
instructed, holding that a "jury is presumed to follow its instructions." Id. at 234.
The Court has been willing to scrutinize the wording of instructions, however.
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The earliest widely recognized use of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence was to prove a person's knowledge of a fact where such knowl-
edge was an element of a crime or cause of action. In the early 1800s
the English courts began to hold that in prosecutions for uttering
forged instruments, proof that the defendant had uttered similar in-
struments in the past was admissible to prove the defendant's knowl-
edge that the instrument in question was forged.1o In the decades
that followed, the case law multiplied quickly. Throughout the nine-
teenth century, English courts regularly admitted evidence of un-
charged misconduct to prove knowledge in prosecutions for uttering
forged instruments, fraud, and receiving stolen goods, as well as in
civil actions based on such conduct. The evidence treatises of the day,
including the influential works of Phillippsll and Starkie,12 all recog-
nized the underlying principle.
In the United States, the evolution was similar. Evidence treatises
generally began as American editions of English works, and at first
were little more than the English editions with a few American cases
added to or substituted for English authority. The first American edi-
tion of the Phillipps treatise, for example, followed the English edition
almost verbatim in stating that in a prosecution for knowingly utter-
ing a forged bank note, "proof that the prisoner had passed other
forged notes of the same kind, is evidence that he knew the note in
question to be forged."13 Similarly, the treatise states that in a prose-
cution for uttering counterfeit money, evidence that the defendant
was found in possession of other pieces of money of the same kind, or
that the defendant uttered other similar counterfeit money, "is evi-
dence of his having known that the money which he uttered was coun-
terfeit."14 Early American versions of Starkie's treatise similarly
recognized the principle.15 This treatise, in fact, added no American
authorities to the list of English cases illustrating the principle. In-
deed, editions of the treatise throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
See, e.g., Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (reversing a capital sen-
tence because instruction that a sentence of life imprisonment would mean the
defendant would die in prison was inadequate to inform the jury that parole
would not be available).
10. See Rex v. Whiley, 168 Eng. Rep. 589 (1804) (also cited at 127 Eng. Rep. 393(1804) as Rex v. Wylie, 2 Leach C.C. 983 (1804)); Rex v. Tattershall, 1 N.R. 93
(1801).
11. SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPs, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 70 (1814).
12. 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 378-79, 382(1824) (evidence admissible to prove intention, malice, or guilty knowledge).
13. SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 137 (2d ed.
1815).
14. Id.
15. THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 378 (Theron
Metcalf ed. 1826).
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tury continued to ignore American authority on this point, 16 even
though by the early part of the nineteenth century, there was in fact
substantial authority for the admissibility of uncharged misconduct
evidence to prove a person's knowledge.
17
The first major American evidence treatise not based on an En-
glish work was that of Greenleaf, the treatise Wigmore took over and
which evolved into Wigmore's own treatise in 1904. In the first edi-
tion of his treatise,' 8 Greenleaf set forth the familiar principle that
"collateral fact" evidence was generally inadmissible, and then noted
that cases had admitted evidence of events occurring before or after
the charged conduct to prove knowledge or intent where those facts
had a "direct bearing" on the charges.19 Later in the treatise, Green-
leaf addressed the admissibility of uncharged misconduct in connec-
tion with prosecutions for forgery and uttering, noting:
[T]o prove guilty knowledge, evidence is admissible that he had about the
same time uttered or attempted to utter other forged instruments, of the same
description; or, that he had such others, or instruments for manufacturing
them, in his possession; . . .or, that at other utterings of the same sort of
papers, he assumed different names; or, that he uttered the paper in question
under false representations made at the time, or the like.
2 0
Editors of later editions of the treatise expanded Greenleafs discus-
sion and added substantial American authority.2 1 When Wigmore un-
dertook revision of this aspect of the treatise in 1898, he began to
formulate the issues in a manner somewhat more familiar to today's
readers.2 2
There is no inherent limit to the number of situations in which
knowledge may be relevant to an issue in a civil or criminal case. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to identify a number of ways in which such
evidence might be used. First, knowledge might be offered to prove a
required mental state whether that state is knowledge itself or some
other state such as "intent." Thus, for example, if a defendant is
charged with receiving stolen goods, a crime that requires proof that
16. See, e.g., THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 621
(George Sharswood et. al. eds., 10th American ed. 1876).
17. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 5 Day 175 (Conn. 1811) (holding in prosecution for utter-
ing a counterfeit bill, statements showing other attempts to utter counterfeit bill
were admissible to show knowledge of bill's counterfeit character); State v. Van
Houten, 2 N.J.L. 495, 497 (1810) (holding in prosecution for uttering counterfeit
bank bill, other acts of uttering were admissible to prove "the knowledge that [the
defendant] had of its being counterfeit at the time of passing it; and the fraudu-
lent and evil intent with which he did it").
18. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1842-1853).
19. Id. at 60-61.
20. Id. at 103-104 (footnotes omitted).
21. See, e.g., 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § lla, at 97
(Isaac F. Refdield rev., 8th ed. 1868).
22. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (John Henry Wigmore
rev., 16th ed. 1898).
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the person was aware the goods were stolen, evidence that the defen-
dant had previously received similar goods from the same source
under the same circumstances would be relevant to prove the defen-
dant was aware that the goods charged in the instant case were also
stolen. In a prosecution for possession of cocaine where the defendant
admits possessing the drugs but claims she thought the cocaine was
sugar, evidence that the defendant had knowingly possessed cocaine
in the past would tend to demonstrate that the defendant knew the
substance at issue was cocaine, and so "intended" to possess cocaine.
Because states of mind almost always must be proven circumstan-
tially, courts have long been lenient in permitting all forms of evi-
dence, including uncharged misconduct, to prove the mental state. As
one court commented, "[i]ntent or state of mind is often the most diffi-
cult element of a crime to prove because many crimes are unwitnessed
and even if a witness is present, the witness can only surmise the ac-
tor's state of mind."23 In the absence of direct evidence, and given the
criminal defendant's constitutional right not to testify, it is easy to
understand why courts would approve the admission of other evi-
dence-even evidence that poses some risk of unfair prejudice-that
would help establish the presence or absence of the required state of
mind. An early nineteenth century Virginia court discussed the diffi-
culty of proving scienter in forgery and uttering cases:
The principle on which this species of evidence has been admitted in those
cases, is, that it is frequently impossible, from the insulated fact of the utter-
ing a single forged note, to ascertain whether the accused knew it was forged
or not. Knowledge exists in the mind; and it is impossible, say the courts, to
become acquainted with the secret knowledge of another, without referring to
his conduct or his acts on other occasions. 2 4
Where the knowledge in the uncharged incident was clear, or
where the circumstances show that the aftermath of the uncharged
incident gave rise to knowledge not previously possessed, the infer-
ence to the required state of mind can be strong and admission is easy
to justify. I will set forth situations of this type in section II.A.25 Un-
fortunately, the need for circumstantial evidence of mental state has
often led courts to admit uncharged misconduct evidence when the in-
ference is considerably weaker; in these cases, courts fail adequately
to account for the fact that the weaker the inference of knowledge
from or as a result of the uncharged misconduct, the less probative the
evidence will be on the subject of knowledge on the charged occasion.
These patterns will be discussed in section II.B.26 Finally, there are
23. State v. Johns, 725 P.2d 312, 321 (Or. 1986). See also 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5239
(1978) (making similar observation).
24. Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 578 (1829).
25. See infra notes 43-92 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 93-180 and accompanying text.
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nonetheless some cases where the inference of knowledge from a re-
peated fact pattern can be strong, even when the inference is weak in
any single case. These cases, often styled under the "doctrine of
chances" theory, will be discussed in section II.C.27
Second, knowledge can be used as an intermediate inference in a
chain leading to a fact other than state of mind. The clearest example
is of knowledge to prove the identity of the actor who committed the
crime or engaged in the conduct at issue in the case. Where, for exam-
ple, a defendant in a murder by poison case possesses highly special-
ized knowledge of the use of the substance in question, and the
defendant is one of a select group of people who possess such knowl-
edge, uncharged misconduct showing such knowledge has the ten-
dency to make it somewhat more likely than it would be without the
evidence that it was the defendant who committed the subject act. I
will address these types of cases in Part III.28 Occasionally, knowl-
edge is relevant to a different fact of consequence, and a few examples
of cases of this kind also will be discussed in Part 111.29
As will appear from the discussion, there is no single answer to
such questions as how similar the uncharged misconduct must be for
the evidence to be admissible to prove knowledge, or how closely con-
nected in time the charged and uncharged events must be. Rather,
the specific theory of each case and the precise manner in which the
evidence is linked to the issue for which it is offered will dictate the
answers to these and other key questions.
II. ADMISSIBILITY TO PROVE KNOWLEDGE AS PART OF
A MENTAL STATE REQUIRED FOR A CRIME
OR CIVIL CLAIM
A person's knowledge is sometimes part of a mental state required
to prove a crime or civil cause of action. To prove guilt in a prosecu-
tion for possession of illegal drugs, for example, the prosecution must
prove not only that the defendant possessed the substance in question,
but that the defendant knew what the substance was.30 The same
principle applies to prosecutions for money laundering, 31 smuggling,
3 2
27. See infra notes 181-98 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance .... ); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) ("[I]t
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, a controlled substance .... ).
31. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000) ("Whoever, knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activ-
ity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
2002]
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transportation of stolen property, 33 and many other crimes. 34 Often,
statutes creating such crimes explicitly make guilty knowledge itself
an element, and some statutes refer to "intent" rather than knowl-
edge, even though knowledge is a necessary part of the relevant
intent.35
Although criminal cases have long made up the bulk of authority
in the area under consideration, knowledge is an essential element or
part of the mental element of some civil claims as well. For example,
in tort law, two ways a plaintiff may establish the necessary state of
mind for fraudulent misrepresentation are to prove that the defendant
"knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be" or
that the defendant "knows that he does not have the basis for his rep-
resentation that he states or implies."36 A public official or public fig-
ure seeking redress for defamation must demonstrate that the
defendant either knew the statement was false and defamatory or
that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of that fact.3 7 Either
type of knowledge will satisfy the required mental state. Similarly, a
cause of action for malicious prosecution generally requires proof that
the defendant "initiated or procured the institution of criminal pro-
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity" is guilty of money laundering
if certain other factors are present).
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2000) (making it a crime to "knowingly and willfully,
with intent to defraud the United States, smuggle[ ], or clandestinely introduce[ I
or attempt[] to smuggle or clandestinely introduce into the United States any
merchandise which should have been invoiced").
33. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2000) (making it a crime to "transport[ ] in interstate
or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been
stolen").
34. See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that in criminal prosecution under federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(1994), government must prove that the defendant knew the substance being dis-
charged was a pollutant).
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 471 (2000) (providing that "[wihoever, with intent to de-
fraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other secur-
ity of the United States" is guilty). The defendant's knowledge that the items
were forged, counterfeited, or altered is implied by the language specifying that
the defendant must intend to defraud. See also 18 U.S.C. § 472 (2000) (similar
provision making it a crime to utter or attempt to utter forged, counterfeited, or
altered obligation or security with intent to defraud).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1976). The third state of mind recog-
nized by the Restatement is that the defendant "does not have the confidence in
the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies." Id. See also PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 741-742 (W. Page Keeton ed., 4th
ed. 1984) (stating that liability for intentional misrepresentation can be sup-
ported when the defendant believed the representation to be false, or made the
representation without any belief as to its truth or with reckless disregard for its
truth, or when the defendant knows that he or she has no sufficient basis of infor-
mation to justify the representation).
37. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580A (1976).
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ceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged" and
that the defendant did this "without probable cause and primarily for
a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice."38 While
knowledge of the falsity of the charge is not specifically made an ele-
ment of the claim, knowledge is obviously one way in which this stan-
dard can be met.39 A similar standard must be satisfied to prevail in
an action for wrongful use of civil proceedings 4o or abuse of process.
4 1
There are a number of inferential paths through which evidence of
uncharged misconduct can be offered to prove knowledge as part of a
required mental state. 42 While all of the paths to be described logi-
cally avoid character-based propensity inferences, some cases raise lit-
tle risk that the jury will misuse the evidence by applying the
forbidden character inference, while in others, the evidence might be
justified as relevant on non-character-based propensity grounds, but
its probative value is limited while the danger that the jury will em-
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1976). Although the test for "probable
cause" is generally thought to be based on the objective, reasonable person stan-
dard, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, § 119, at 876, the Restatement pro-
vides that the defendant must also hold the subjective belief that there is enough
information as to the facts and the law to justify initiating the criminal proceed-
ing (essentially, that the party is guilty). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 662
cmt. j (1976). This position has been criticized, however. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 36, § 119, at 877.
39. According to the Restatement, the only proper purpose for initiating a criminal
prosecution is to aid in the enforcement of law by bringing an offender to justice.
If the person initiating the prosecution does not believe the individual to be
guilty, that person's purpose is not proper. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 668 cmt. e (1976). Probable cause, in turn, exists if the person initiating the
prosecution correctly or reasonably believes that the accused has acted or failed
to act in a specified way, that the person's acts or omissions are those required for
the criminal offense, and that the initiator is "sufficiently informed as to the law
and the facts to justify him in initiating or continuing the prosecution." Id § 662.
40. See id. §§ 674-76.
41. See id. § 682.
42. It will be assumed for present purposes that the party against whom the evidence
is offered contests the element of knowledge. When a party concedes an element,
there is room to argue that the court should exclude evidence offered by the other
party concerning that issue, particularly if, as with uncharged misconduct evi-
dence, there is a great risk of unfair prejudice from its admission. Cf. Old Chiefv.
United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding in prosecution for, inter alia, being a
felon in possession of a firearm, evidence concerning relevant felony was not ad-
missible when the defendant offered to stipulate to that element of the crime;
while the prosecution is normally entitled to prove its case in any manner other-
wise authorized by rules, in this context the defendant's offered stipulation gave
the government everything its evidence would have provided). The notion that
evidence should not be admissible where an issue is uncontested has long been
recognized in the context of uncharged misconduct evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Lyle, 118 S.E. 803 (S.C. 1923) (holding in prosecution for uttering forged check,
trial court should not have admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct to prove
knowledge or intent because the defendant claimed he was not the person who
uttered the check, not that he lacked the requisite state of mind for the crime).
20021
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ploy the character inference is significant. It is in these latter cases
that courts must be especially vigilant.
A. Fact Patterns in Which Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct to Prove Knowledge on the Occasion in
Question Can Be Justified
In some cases, evidence of uncharged misconduct will demonstrate
the person had knowledge of a relevant fact at the time of the un-
charged misconduct. The fact-finder is then asked to infer that the
individual retained that knowledge up to the time of the charged
event. In some cases, the inference of past knowledge, and in turn
knowledge on the occasion in question, will be very strong.
In one type of case, the uncharged event or events themselves are
so suggestive, and so similar to the charged event, that the inference
of knowledge is easy to draw and the danger of unfair prejudice by
jury misuse of the evidence is slight. One fairly simple type of case for
the application of the principle would be as follows: The defendant is
charged with transporting stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, in
violation of federal law.4 3 Successful prosecution requires proof that
the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. The defendant admits ob-
taining the vehicle from X the day before driving it across state lines.
The prosecution offers evidence that some time prior to the charged
event, the defendant observed X break into a garage, shatter the win-
dow on a vehicle inside, and start the car by "hot wiring" the ignition.
At X's request, the defendant then drove the vehicle away, crossing
state lines. The defendant admits knowing that the vehicle in the pre-
vious situation was stolen, but denies knowing that the vehicle named
in the charged event was stolen.4 4 Or suppose the defendant is
charged with possession of illegal drugs. The defendant admits pos-
session of the substance, but denies knowing what it was. To prove
the defendant's knowledge, the prosecution offers evidence that in the
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2000) ("Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years") (emphasis added).
44. Cf State v. Richardson, 190 N.W. 130 (Iowa 1922) (holding in larceny prosecution
involving theft of vehicles, evidence that the defendant had previously received
stolen vehicles from the same sources over a considerable period of time was ad-
missible to prove the defendant knew the vehicle at issue in the case was stolen
and thus had the requisite intent for the charged crime); State v. Marr, 16 P.2d
469, 471 (Kan. 1932) (holding in grand larceny prosecution charging the defen-
dant with being an accessory after the fact in theft of automobile tires, evidence
of the defendant's prior conviction for stealing a tire and wheel from an automo-
bile and of a conversation in jail between the defendant and one Lowman, the
person who stole the tires in question, were admissible to prove the defendant's
knowledge that Lowman had stolen the tires; "[t]he circumstances, we think,
were abundantly sufficient to apprise the defendant that Lowman was himself
guilty of theft of the stolen tires in his possession").
[Vol. 81:115
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past, the defendant had possessed the same kind of drugs, and that he
had been arrested, charged, and convicted of that crime.4 5 Conspiracy
cases also fit this rough pattern; evidence of the defendant's involve-
ment in similar acts with the same alleged co-conspirators has been
admitted to prove the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the
conspiracy. 46 Cases involving uttering of forged instruments have
been reported for many years,4 7 and in fact were among the earliest
cases in which evidence of uncharged misconduct was admitted to
prove knowledge. 48
In these cases, the evidence concerning the prior event is relevant
in at least two ways. To take the stolen vehicle example, the evidence
first tends to demonstrate that the defendant is the kind of person
who would deal in stolen vehicles, and thus that the defendant might
have done so on this occasion. For this purpose, the evidence is inad-
missible character evidence.4 9 Second, the evidence is relevant to the
defendant's knowledge that the vehicle in question was stolen. For
45. Cf. United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 847-49 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
in prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, evidence that
the defendant had previously been convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute was admissible to prove knowledge and intent to distribute).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 112 F.3d 977, 980-981 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing in prosecution for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, evidence that
the defendant earlier obtained methamphetamine from one of the alleged co-con-
spirators, and of other related matters, was admissible to prove the defendant's
knowledge of the alleged conspiracy, as well as intent to distribute drugs, his
plan to join the conspiracy, his opportunity to do so, and the absence of mistake or
accident).
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 18 (1882) (holding in prosecu-
tion for obtaining property by false pretenses, evidence that the defendant had
used similar pretenses to make sales to other persons was admissible to show
guilty knowledge and intent); Bishop v. State, 55 Md. 138 (1880) (holding on
charge of forging and uttering a bond, evidence that at about same time, the de-
fendant held and uttered similarly forged instruments admissible); State v.
Smith, 5 Day 175 (Conn. 1811).
48. See Rex v. Whiley, 168 Eng. Rep. 589 (1804), also reported as Rex v. Wylie, 127
Eng. Rep. 393 (1804), for one of the earliest cases involving the use of uncharged
misconduct evidence. The defendants were charged with forging and uttering
bank notes. To prove the defendants were aware that the note with which they
attempted to pay a merchant was not genuine, the prosecution offered evidence
that the defendants had uttered forged notes on three recent occasions. The court
held the evidence admissible to prove the defendants' knowledge. Lord Ellenbor-
ough wrote:
The indictment alleges that the prisoners uttered this note knowing it to
be forged, and they must know that, without the reception of other evi-
dence than that which the mere circumstances of the transaction itself
would furnish, it would be impossible to ascertain whether they uttered
it with a guilty knowledge of its having been forged, or whether it was
uttered under circumstances which shewed their minds to be free from
that guilt.
168 Eng. Rep. at 590.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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this purpose, the evidence does not violate the character ban, nor does
it involve anything but a trivial propensity inference.50 The permissi-
ble reasoning is as follows:
EVIDENCE: On a prior occasion, the defendant received a stolen
vehicle from X under circumstances strongly suggesting that
the vehicle was stolen.
-4INFERENCE: The defendant knew the vehicle was stolen.
->CONCLUSION: The defendant knew the vehicle in
question, also received from X, was stolen.
This chain of reasoning avoids a character-based propensity infer-
ence because it does not require the fact-finder to infer that the defen-
dant is motivated by character to act in any particular way or that
character has caused the defendant to hold any specific belief or
knowledge.51 True, one must infer that if the defendant had knowl-
edge at a certain time, X is likely to retain that knowledge at the time
of the charged event. However the "propensity" to retain knowledge is
nearly a universal human trait, and thus is not governed by the "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" rule. Because it does not reflect negatively on
the defendant's character nor does it distinguish the defendant from
other people, the evidence is likely admissible.52 The only sense in
50. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
51. As the Massachusetts court stated in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16,
(1882): "It is the knowledge, which it may be inferred he must have derived from
other transactions, and not the intent that the defendant had in other transac-
tions that renders the evidence admissible as affording just ground for inference
against him as to intent in the matter now under examination."
Id. at 18.
52. Rule 404(b) is actually superfluous. The other part of Rule 404 makes clear that
character evidence (in whatever form) is inadmissible to prove conduct in con-
formity unless certain exceptions, not involved here, apply. Thus, by implication,
any other use of character evidence, including evidence of uncharged misconduct,
is potentially allowed. Assuming the evidence is relevant on a non-character ba-
sis, the only situations in which its admissibility will be in question are those in
which its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in
Rule 403, especially that of unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice, in turn, cannot
arise from evidence of neutral moral value. Thus, propensity inferences not re-
quiring reasoning from a person's moral character are not governed by Rule
404(b).
At least one commentator has asserted that this type of cases raises a genera-
lized propensity inference:
If a defendant accused of heroin possession claims that he did not know
that the substance was heroin, the prosecutor would be permitted to re-
but this claimed lack of knowledge by showing that the defendant on
previous occasions had knowingly possessed heroin. From knowledge on
a previous occasion, the Factfinder is asked to infer knowledge on the
present occasion, and this is a type of generalized propensity inference:
A person who has obtained knowledge of some fact has a propensity to
retain that knowledge.
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which the inference of knowledge at the time of the charged event in-
volves a propensity inference is a trivial one, not of concern to the pre-
sent analysis. All the fact-finder need employ is the inference that one
who receives a vehicle under circumstances strongly suggesting it was
stolen would infer that it was in fact stolen, and that the same person
would draw the same conclusion if presented with another vehicle by
the same source at a later date. 53 This is an inference any rational
person might make, regardless of that person's character.54 Courts
have applied this reasoning to many types of cases in addition to those
discussed in the examples. 5 5
Naturally, the inference of the defendant's knowledge is rarely con-
clusive and often is not even particularly compelling, and the strength
of the inference can be crucial in determining the validity of the theory
as applied to a particular case. 56 Where the defendant received stolen
Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 790 (1981). It is important to understand
that Kuhns' "general propensity" concept is considerably broader than propensity
as applied to the particular person whose conduct or state of mind is at issue.
Thus, while he is correct that a propensity inference is involved in this type of
case, the inference can be made based on an understanding of general human
nature rather than anything peculiar to, or any characteristic about, the specific
person.
53. "In a prosecution upon a charge of receiving stolen goods, the defendant's knowl-
edge of their having been stolen is sufficiently proved, if, from the circumstances
established, he must have understood that they were stolen." State v. Marr, 16
P.2d 469, 471 (Kan. 1932) (quoting State v. Stanley, 254 P. 314 (Kan. 1927)).
"The principle of relevancy herein involved is that proof of other utterances will
show that the accused was informed of the character of the thing uttered and to
thus show his intent and knowledge of the utterance involved in the present accu-
sation." Marshall McKusick, Techniques in Proof of Other Crimes to Show Guilty
Knowledge and Intent, 24 IowA L. REV. 471, 478-79 (1939).
54. The same type of reasoning applies to the drug dealing hypothetical. Evidence of
the past deal, together with evidence that the defendant was convicted as a result
of the conduct, constitutes circumstantial evidence that the defendant was aware
of the nature of the substance sold on the charged occasion. The inference can be
made without reference to the defendant's character- or non-character-based pro-
pensity to engage in the conduct.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
in prosecution for knowingly discharging pollutant, evidence that the defendant
had been involved in prior discharges under similar circumstances was admissi-
ble to prove the defendant's knowledge, an essential element of the crime).
56. Describing the basic theory as applied to cases involving different degrees of cir-
cumstantial evidence of knowledge, Wigmore wrote:
The process of thought is: The other act will probably have resulted in
some sort of warning or knowledge; this warning or knowledge must
probably have led to the knowledge in question. There may occasionally
be a logical shortcut or a condensation of this process-as where A at a
former attempt to pass the same counterfeit bill, was expressly told that
it was counterfeit-but such cases cause no difficulty; and the difficulty
that does arise can always be accounted for by a doubt as to one or the
other of the above two elements. The principle is clearly enough seen in
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goods from the same source as in the prior instances, and it is clear
that the defendant was aware in the prior instances that the goods
were stolen, the inference of knowledge on the charged occasion is
likely to be extremely strong.57 The inference of knowledge can be
particularly strong where the defendant is also aware that the goods
were stolen from the same person or location.58 In the drug posses-
sion hypothetical, 59 the fact that the defendant was charged and con-
victed of the crime means that it was found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was aware of the nature of the substance being
sold. In such a case, the inference of knowledge on the charged occa-
sion can be almost overwhelming. 60
its application ... but it has been expounded, more or less incompletely,
in various judicial utterances.
2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §301, at 239 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1979).
57. In Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 124 S.E. 237 (Va. 1924), for example, the defen-
dant was charged with larceny and receiving stolen goods. To prove the defen-
dant knew the goods were stolen, the trial court allowed the prosecution to offer
evidence of the defendant's possession of other stolen goods received from the
same source prior to the charged event. In those prior instances, the defendant
was "expressly informed that the goods were stolen." Id. at 239. Similarly, in
State v. Mincer, 100 S.E. 339 (N.C. 1919), where the defendant was charged with
larceny and receiving stolen goods, evidence that at the time of his arrest the
defendant was also in possession of a watch stolen at another time was admissi-
ble to prove the defendant's knowledge that the goods charged in the indictment
were stolen. The court noted that the defendant also had in his possession a
newspaper containing an account of the robberies at which the goods he pos-
sessed were stolen. In Goodfellow v. People, 224 P. 1051, 1052 (Colo. 1924),
where the defendant was charged with receiving a stolen Ford automobile, evi-
dence that two months earlier, the defendant and the same person from whom he
obtained the Ford worked together to strip the parts off of another car and sank
the body in a lake was admissible to show the defendant's guilty knowledge when
he received the Ford. See also Piano v. State, 49 So. 803, 804 (Ala. 1909)
("[E]vidence that on other occasions about the same time [the defendant] had
received other articles from the same thief, knowing that they were stolen, is
relevant to show a scienter in respect to the property laid in the indictment.");
People v. Wagman, 142 N.E. 743, 745-746 (Ill. 1924) (holding that, where the
defendant charged with receiving stolen goods claimed lack of knowledge that the
goods were stolen, evidence the defendant had received stolen property from the
same thieves on other occasions was admissible to prove knowledge; evidence
also tended to demonstrate a plan to deal with these thieves); State v. Rosenberg,
192 N.W. 194, 195 (Minn. 1923) (similar; holding evidence of receipt of stolen
goods from same sources admissible to prove guilty knowledge and "system or
plan of operation").
58. See Copperman v. People, 56 N.Y. 591 (1874) (holding that testimony of thief that
he had stolen similar goods from the same store on ten or twelve prior occasions
and sold them to the defendant, where the defendant knew the goods were stolen,
was admissible to prove the defendant's knowledge that the goods in question,
stolen from the same store and obtained from the same thief, were stolen).
59. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
60. Indeed, even had the jury been mistaken as to the defendant's knowledge, and
even had the defendant been acquitted, the trial experience almost undoubtedly
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The fact that the non-character reasoning is rational and intuitive
does not eliminate any risk that the jury might employ the forbidden
character reasoning in this example, and the facts of each case must
be analyzed carefully.6 1 Where the inference of notice to the defen-
dant from the uncharged events is not particularly strong, and where
the charged event is more than minimally different from the un-
charged events, one might expect a jury to be equally likely to infer
the defendant's character-based propensity to deal in stolen property
as to infer the defendant's simple knowledge based on prior experi-
ence. As a result, courts should not admit such evidence any time a
valid chain of inferences can be constructed. Instead, courts should
handle uncharged misconduct evidence the same way they deal with
any evidence admissible for one purpose but not for another. In some
circumstances, the evidence should be admitted with a limiting in-
struction;62 in more extreme cases, where the danger of unfair
prejudice is great and the legitimate probative value of the evidence is
comparatively slight, the court should exclude the evidence entirely.63
Cases raising these problems will be discussed in greater detail
later.6 4
In some cases, it is not necessarily the uncharged acts themselves,
but their aftermath, which provides an inference of knowledge that
can be found to have persisted to the time of the events at issue in the
case. Suppose, for example, that the defendant is charged with the
crime of uttering counterfeit money or other negotiable instruments.
If the prosecution offers evidence that the defendant had previously
uttered identical items, and had been charged and acquitted of the
crime because of failure of proof that the defendant knew the items
would have provided the defendant with the requisite knowledge. See infra notes
65-66 and accompanying text.
61. In United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 655
(1936), the court wrote:
[T]he competence of [uncharged misconduct] evidence does not depend
upon conformity with any fixed conditions, such as upon direct proof of
scienter, or the identity of the thief in the earlier instance, or of the vic-
tim, or the number of instances in which the accused received stolen
goods, or the similarity of the goods stolen. These are all relevant cir-
cumstances but not necessary constituents .... The judge must decide
each time whether the other instance or instances form a basis for sound
inference as to the guilty knowledge of the accused in the transaction
under inquiry; that is all that can be said about the matter.
Id. at 606 (L. Hand, J.).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible .. .for one purpose
but not admissible ... for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.").
63. For a detailed discussion of the doctrine of limited admissibility, see DAVID P.
LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: Selected Rules of Lim-
ited Admissibility ch. 1 (Rev. ed. 2002).
64. See infra section II.B.
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were counterfeit, how might this evidence be relevant if the defendant
denies knowing the instruments were counterfeit on the charged occa-
sion?65 The evidence, of course, might tend to establish that the de-
fendant is a person of criminal character who would deal in
counterfeit instruments, and thus might have done so on the occasion
in question. But the evidence would violate the character ban if of-
fered for this purpose. Instead, the evidence could be offered to prove
knowledge without resort to any character-based propensity inference.
The reasoning would be as follows:
EVIDENCE: On prior occasions, the defendant was acquitted of
uttering identical instruments.
-NFERENCE: The defendant learned that the items were
counterfeit from the experience of the charges and trials.
-- CONCLUSION: The defendant knew the identical in-
struments involved in the charged incident were
counterfeit.
In this inferential chain, there is no occasion to infer that the defen-
dant had a criminal character or to employ any problematic propen-
sity inference.66 The evidence is relevant simply because it shows the
defendant's awareness of a fact-that the items were counterfeit. If
the defendant learned from the aftermath of the prior experiences
that items of this type were not genuine, it is likely the defendant
continued to possess that knowledge at a later time.
This reasoning has often been employed in prosecutions for posses-
sion of illegal drugs where the defendant admits possession but denies
knowing what the substance was. Evidence that the defendant had
previously been charged with possessing the same substance would be
admissible,67 even if the defendant was acquitted of the charge.68 Al-
65. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 5 Day 175 (Conn. 1811); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132
Mass. 16, 18 (1882).
66. For discussion of the type of propensity inference governed by the rule under
consideration, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
67. See United States v. Simon, 842 F.2d 552, 554 (1"t Cir. 1988) (holding that, where
the defendant charged in connection with the transportation of a 55-pound box of
marijuana claimed he thought the box contained books because a university pro-
fessor had asked him to carry the box and told him it contained books, evidence of
earlier conviction for cultivating marijuana was admissible to prove knowledge;
one who has "a background involving marijuana cultivation is not likely to be-
lieve that a box containing marijuana feels like [or weighs about the same as] a
comparatively sized box of books, and therefore would have been more suspicious
of the... [professor's] story [had there been such a... person]"); United States v.
Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 138 (1Pt Cir. 1990) (holding that, where the defendant
charged with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute claimed he was una-
ware of the cocaine in the car, it was proper to admit evidence of the defendant's
two prior convictions for possessing marijuana and cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute; "[s]ince one who has previous experience with drugs is more likely.., to
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most certainly, if the defendant was unfamiliar with the substance
prior to the previous experience, the defendant became familiar with
it by virtue of the experience. United States v. Perkins,69 in which the
defendant was charged, inter alia, with possession of cocaine base
with intent to distribute, offers a simple example. Police searching
the defendant's apartment found crack cocaine and other drug-related
items. At trial, the prosecution was required to prove that the defen-
dant knew he was in possession of the crack cocaine and that it was
unlawful to possess it. To prove knowledge and intent, the prosecu-
tion offered evidence that about six months prior to the defendant's
arrest on the current charge, the defendant was found in possession of
crack cocaine, and that he pled guilty to simple possession. On appeal
of his conviction, the defendant argued that admission of the un-
charged misconduct evidence was error. The court affirmed:
The court correctly admitted the prior act as tending to show the defendant
knew he was in possession of a controlled substance .... Knowledge acquired
by the defendant as a result of the previous offense (i.e., what the controlled
substance crack cocaine is) was probative of his knowing possession of crack
cocaine at the time charged in the Indictment. Additionally, the prior offense
was admissible to show intent. The defendant was charged with possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute. Consequently, the government had to
prove that he had the intent to distribute. 7 0
The ruling in Perkins is correct. Evidence that the defendant pleaded
guilty to possession of the same substance he is now charged with pos-
sessing provides compelling evidence that the defendant knew the na-
ture of the substance. Though there is always some risk that the jury
will misuse the evidence by, for example, convicting the defendant for
being a drug dealer rather than for his guilt on the charged occasion,
the probative value of the evidence on the essential element of knowl-
edge is almost certainly not overwhelmed by this danger.
Relatively subtle changes in facts can affect the analysis, however.
Suppose the defendant is charged with negotiating forged securities,
and the prosecution wishes to offer evidence that the defendant had
recognize (and hence to know) that the bags' contents were drugs than one with-
out such experience, the inferences at issue do not involve character").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 464 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding in prose-
cution for importation of marijuana where the defendant admitted driving the
vehicle containing the drugs but denied knowing they were in the vehicle, evi-
dence of prior unsuccessful prosecution for same crime was admissible to prove
knowledge where the defendant also claimed in the other case that he did not
know about the contraband in the vehicle he was driving). The same analysis has
been employed in forgery cases. One commentator wrote: "[T]he cases abun-
dantly support the conclusion that other forged documents may be admitted,
though the accused had been tried and acquitted on the charge of forging them."
Marshall McKusick, Techniques in Proof of Other Crimes to Show Guilty Knowl-
edge and Intent, 24 IowA L. REV. 471, 481 (1939).
69. 94 F.3d 429 (8th Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 434-35.
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previously uttered similar forged instruments but had neither been
challenged at the time of doing so nor charged with an offense. In this
situation, the evidence is not relevant on the same basis as in the pre-
vious cases. Whereas in the other cases the unsuccessful experience
itself gave notice of the forgery, in this fact pattern that is not true. If
the evidence is relevant, its value depends either on a propensity in-
ference (that the defendant is the sort of person who would knowingly
utter forged instruments) or a "doctrine of chances" rationale (that it
is unlikely the defendant would innocently utter similar instruments
on several occasions). The evidence is clearly inadmissible under the
first rationale, and the applicability of the second to proof of knowl-
edge will be considered shortly.71 Nevertheless, some courts have ad-
mitted the evidence in this kind of case to prove the defendant's
knowledge and thus a required mental state.72
In the cases just discussed, admission of the uncharged misconduct
evidence can be justified because it confronts the defense of lack of
knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed. If the defendant
makes no such claim, the theory is not applicable. In United States v.
Eggleston,73 for example, the defendant was charged with possession
of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The defendant was arrested
while driving an automobile with one passenger. The drugs were
found in the trunk. The defendant claimed that he was unaware of
the presence of the drugs and that they belonged to his passenger.
The trial court permitted the prosecution to offer evidence that six
years earlier, the defendant had been convicted of possession of thirty-
nine individually wrapped packages of cocaine with intent to dis-
71. For discussion of the doctrine of chances, see infra section II.C.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Watford, 894 F.3d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
evidence that the defendant's mother had previously cashed money orders ob-
tained from the defendant that were altered in same manner as those in the
charged crime was admissible to prove the defendant's knowledge of their altera-
tion); People v. McGlade, 72 P. 600, 601 (Cal. 1903) (holding in prosecution for
forgery, evidence that the defendant forged similar instruments at about the
same time was admissible to prove "guilty knowledge and intent"); Dugat v.
State, 160 S.W. 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (in prosecution for passing forged
check, evidence that at time of his arrest, the defendant possessed other similar
forged instruments admissible to prove knowledge; court did not state whether
the defendant knew the instruments found in his possession were forged); State
v. McWilliams, 206 N.W. 114 (Iowa 1925) (similar). An early writer seemed to
approve of admission in these cases. See McKusick, supra note 53, at 479 ("While
the cogency of the proof of guilty knowledge is the better established by evidence
[that the defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to utter similar notes], never-
theless the successful utterance of counterfeit money or the evidence thereof
seems to be logically as relevant in those instances of an unsuccessful attempt to
utter the money in question."). But see 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23,
§ 5245 (calling the propriety of admission "less clear" where the prior efforts were
successful).
73. 165 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1999).
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tribute, purportedly to prove knowledge. Focusing on the defense, the
appellate court wrote:
If Eggleston's defense in the present case had been that he thought the co-
caine was foot powder, or some other substance, the fact that he had previ-
ously possessed cocaine with the intention of distributing it would certainly be
relevant, because it would tend to show that he knows what cocaine is and
could not plausibly be thought to have mistaken it for some innocent sub-
stance. This, however, was not Eggleston's defense. His theory was simply
that the cocaine belonged to Robinson, not to himself, and that, indeed, he did
not even know that the cocaine was in the trunk. In this situation, we see no
relevance whatever in the previous incident.
7 4
A wide variety of crimes and torts require proof of a specific mental
state, and courts have approved the admission of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence to prove knowledge in most, if not all, of these situa-
tions. For example, in a prosecution for first-degree murder, it is
common to require proof that the defendant acted with "malice afore-
thought."75 The most obvious way malice aforethought might be
proven is by demonstrating that the defendant intended the death of
the victim. 7 6 Thus, as the authors of one treatise state, "knowledge
that the powder put into Aunt Matilda's tea was a poison and not an
artificial sweetener" would be admissible to prove that the defendant
did not act inadvertently or from mistake, but with intent.
7 7 Knowl-
edge that the powder was poison, in turn, could be inferred from many
types of evidence, including other events in which the defendant used
the poison to commit murder or other harm. Some of the earlier En-
glish cases were exactly of this type,78 and American courts have often
employed this theory as well. 79
74. Id. at 625-26. The court held that the error in admitting the evidence was harm-
less, however. Id. at 626.
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000) (defining murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999)
(similar).
76. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1999) (stating that malice can be express
or implied, and providing that express malice exists "when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature," and
implied malice exists "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart").
77. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5245, at 504.
78. See, e.g., Regina v. Garner, 176 Eng. Rep. 594, 595 (1876) (holding in prosecution
for poisoning murder of Garner's mother using arsenic, evidence that others con-
nected with the defendants died of poisoning, at least one of which involved arse-
nic, was admissible to prove intent); Rex v. Mogg, 172 Eng. Rep. 741 (1830). The
defendant in Rex was charged with administering sulphuric acid to eight horses
with intent to kill them claimed he did so to make the horses' coats shine rather
than to injure them. To prove intent, the court admitted evidence that the defen-
dant had frequently done the same thing, stating that "other acts of administer-
ing may go to shew whether it was done with the intent charged in the
indictment." Id. at 742.
79. See, e.g., People v. Archerd, 477 P.2d 421, 435-36 (Cal. 1970) (holding in prosecu-
tion for murder by poison, trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
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Courts have also admitted the evidence on this basis in other types
of homicide cases,8 0 as well as in prosecutions for different kinds of
crimes. In prosecutions for forgery, similar transactions have been ad-
mitted to prove knowledge and intent.S1 As already discussed in con-
nection with a hypothetical case,8 2 in larceny prosecutions where the
defendant denies knowing the goods he or she possessed were stolen,
evidence that the defendant received other stolen goods from the same
source has been admitted to prove knowledge that the goods were sto-
len, and thus the intent required for larceny.83
In drug conspiracy prosecutions, evidence that the defendant pre-
viously engaged in similar drug transactions, often with an alleged co-
conspirator, has been admitted to prove knowledge of the conspiracy,
and thus intent to participate in it.84 In prosecutions for embezzle-
ment of an employer's funds, evidence of other acts of embezzlement
from same employer has been admitted to prove fraudulent intent by
evidence of three similar prior murders and stating that evidence "tended toprove the issues of identity, intent, malice, premeditation, motive, knowledge of
the means used to commit the crime, and modus operandi").
80. See, e.g., People v. Seaman, 65 N.W. 203 (Mich. 1895) (holding in prosecution for
manslaughter by performing an abortion, as a result of which both the mother
and fetus died, prosecution evidence of several other abortions performed by the
defendant was admissible to rebut an inference that the deaths were a result of
accident; court held that because miscarriages occur from natural causes, proof of
the other acts was necessary to demonstrate requisite intent).
81. Cf. People v. Hansen, 216 P. 399, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923) (holding in prosecution
for forging and uttering a counterfeit deed, evidence that the defendant did simi-
lar act eight months later was admissible to prove knowledge and intent, both of
which were deemed essential elements of the charged crimes).
82. For the facts of the hypothetical, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., State v. McCarty, 194 N.W. 335, 335-336 (N.D. 1923) (holding in prose-
cution for larceny in stealing calves, evidence that the defendant had obtained
stolen horses from the same source was admissible to prove the defendant's
knowledge that calves were stolen, and from that, the defendant's criminal in-
tent); cf. United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding in
prosecution for conspiracy to defraud, interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty, and bank fraud, all arising from alleged theft of Ford Motor Company rebate
checks, evidence that the defendant had recently deposited two other refund
checks into the same personal bank account was admissible to prove his knowl-
edge that the checks in question were stolen; the defendant's knowledge was the
critical issue in his trial). Cases of this type overlap with prosecutions for receiv-
ing stolen goods, in which the required mental state is knowledge itself. Indeed,
in many cases, the defendant is charged with both larceny and receiving stolen
goods.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 112 F.3d 977, 980-981 (8th Cir. 1997); see
also United States v. Leal, 74 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecu-
tion for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, evidence that
the defendant had knowingly participated in transportation of marijuana in past
was admissible to prove knowledge of nature of current activity and thus intent
to distribute).
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demonstrating knowledge or absence of mistake. 85 A similar theory
has been employed in a larceny prosecution growing out of false repre-
sentations inducing people to purchase businesses.8 6 In prosecutions
for obstruction of justice, evidence that a defendant had been con-
victed of similar acts on another occasion has been admitted to prove
the defendant's knowledge that acts were unlawful and thus the de-
fendant's intent to obstruct.8 7 In a civil negligence and nuisance ac-
tion arising from pollution, the court admitted evidence of the
defendant's air quality violations in one state to prove the defendant
knew it could not comply with air quality requirements of another
state, and thus acted willfully or negligently.
8 8
Courts have also applied the knowledge-to-state of mind theory in
a variety of fraud cases. In prosecutions for fraudulently obtaining
funds by passing a bogus check, evidence of other similar acts have
been admitted to prove the accused knew the check was not good, and
thus that the accused intended to defraud.8 9 Similarly, in prosecu-
85. See, e.g., People v. Forman, 228 P. 378, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (holding other
shortages admissible to prove knowledge, absence of mistake, and thus fraudu-
lent intent).
86. See Commonwealth v. Clancy, 72 N.E. 842, 843-44 (Mass. 1905) (holding in prose-
cution for larceny arising from alleged conspiracy in which the defendant and
another person on three occasions made false representations about value of busi-
nesses in order to induce people to purchase those businesses, evidence of each of
the instances was admissible on each of the other counts "upon the question of
the knowledge of each of the falsity of the representations made, and of the inten-
tion of each to cheat each purchaser by means of them").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-50 (1st Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing in prosecution for corruptly persuading a witness to destroy or conceal objects
with intent to impair their availability for use in an official proceeding, endeavor-
ing to obstruct a grand jury investigation, and conspiracy to commit these of-
fenses, evidence that the defendant had been convicted of very similar conduct in
the past was admissible to prove the defendant's knowledge that acts were illegal
where corrupt motive and specific intent to violate law is an essential element of
charged crimes, as well as to refute the defendant's claim that he had a good faith
belief that it was not illegal to discard objects not yet under subpoena; though
some of the admitted evidence might have gone too far and caused prejudice,
court held that it was highly probable that any evidence admitted unnecessarily
did not contribute to relevant verdicts).
88. See Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995, 999-1002 (10th Cir. 1994).
89. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding in
prosecution for theft by issuing insufficient funds checks, evidence that the defen-
dant had previously engaged in similar conduct was admissible to prove knowl-
edge or absence of mistake or accident, and thus to prove essential element of
intent); Beach v. State, 230 P. 758, 759-60 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924) (holding that,
to prove the defendant intended to defraud by obtaining money with check for
which he did not have adequate funds, evidence the defendant had engaged in
similar transactions was admissible to prove knowledge that the check was not
good, and thus fraudulent intent in passing it).
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tions9O and civil actions9 1 involving fraudulent use of falsely made or
altered instruments, evidence of similar transactions or participation
in similar schemes has been admitted to prove knowledge that the in-
struments were not valid, and thus intent to defraud. This theory has
also been used in more elemental fraud cases. 9 2
B. Fact Patterns that Raise Greater Dangers of Jury Misuse
of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
Evidence of uncharged misconduct should not always be admitted
to prove knowledge, and consequently, a required state of mind.
American courts have long recognized the need to exercise caution in
order to avoid violating the ban on character evidence. In 1853, for
90. See, e.g., United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1383-84 (10th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing in prosecution for aiding and abetting interstate transportation of falsely
made and forged securities and conspiracy to commit those offenses, evidence of
an earlier check scheme involving a codefendant was admissible to prove a code-
fendant's knowledge or absence of mistake as to the true nature of the instru-
ments at issue); United States v. Drumright, 534 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1976)(holding in prosecution for passing and uttering falsely made and altered United
States obligation with intent to defraud, evidence of a mutilated bill the defen-
dant had used to purchase goods three days before charged events was admissible
to prove knowledge where the relationship between the two bills was estab-
lished); cf. United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1995) (hold-ing in prosecution for conspiracy to defraud, mail fraud, and money laundering in
connection with fraudulent loan program, evidence that some of the defendant's
co-workers at a different brokerage for which the defendant worked previously
had been convicted of engaging in similar fraudulent scheme was admissible to
prove the defendant's knowledge of the type of scheme at issue; five year gap
between earlier events and charged crimes was not so large that district court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence).
91. See, e.g., Farmers' Nat'l Bank of Kingsley v. Pratt, 186 N.W. 924 (Iowa 1922)(holding in action by an alleged bona fide purchaser in due course of a promissory
note, where the defendant claimed the original payee had made fraudulent repre-
sentations at time of execution, evidence of original payee's representations to
others executing notes at about the same time and under similar circumstances
were admissible to prove knowledge and intent).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding in
prosecution for making false representations to bank to influence its action on a
loan application, evidence that the defendant had been turned down for an auto-
mobile loan was admissible to prove the defendant's knowledge of her limited
borrowing capacity, which tended to prove intent to defraud); United States v.
Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecution arising from
theft of automobile company rebate checks, evidence that the defendant had re-
cently deposited two stolen checks into same personal bank account used in
charged crime was admissible to prove knowledge that the checks were stolen;
court did not make clear, however, that the defendant was aware earlier checks
had been stolen); Welch v. Dunning, 158 N.W. 323 (Wis. 1916) (holding in action
for fraudulent sale of diseased cattle, evidence that the defendant had exper-ienced disease trouble with previous shipments of cattle was admissible to prove
the defendant's knowledge that cattle were not healthy, and thus fraudulent in-
tent in making sale).
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example, the court in Farrer v. Ohio,93 an appeal of a conviction for
murder by poison, found error in the trial court's admission of evi-
dence concerning the earlier poisoning death of a Mrs. Green, possibly
connected with the defendant. 94 Justice Corwin, wrote:
It does not appear, that the same hand which poisoned Mrs. Green must have
poisoned Mrs. Forrest. There is no necessity to show that Nancy poisoned
Mrs. Green, in order to prove that she had poison wherewith she might have
poisoned the Forrest family. That she had such poison, elsewhere sufficiently
appears.... Nor can it be successfully argued that this proof of the poisoning
in August, was necessary to prove that in November the prisoner knew the
nature and uses of arsenic. The intent of the prisoner was not to be so estab-
lished. In the case of passing counterfeit money, evidence of other acts of
passing is admitted, because many persons occasionally take counterfeit
money, and attempt to pass it, while ignorant of its spurious character. But
persons do not buy arsenic without knowing its uses .... There was direct
evidence that Nancy purchased arsenic, knowing its destructive character-
her avowed object being to use it for the destruction of rats. And there is no
evidence even tending to show that the prisoner made any pretense of having
used arsenic while ignorant of its real character.
9 5
Corwin thus concluded that the evidence should have been excluded
because "[it could not perform any other office than that of needlessly
exciting prejudice against the accused."9 6
Agreeing with this conclusion, Justice Thurman directly addressed
the lack of need for the evidence as well as the potential prejudice its
admission might cause:
Is it not undeniable that the fact is almost, or quite, as well known, to people
generally, that arsenic is a deadly poison, as that a dagger, or a gun, is a
deadly weapon? I think it is.... [O]n a trial for homicide with a knife or gun,
no one would think of permitting the prosecution, under the pretext of show-
ing that the accused knew the weapon would kill, to give testimony of other
homicides committed with it by him, unless some evidence had been intro-
duced tending to prove that it was not a deadly weapon, or that the defendant
supposed it was not.... With what object, then, was the proof of the poisoning
of Mrs. Green offered? To prove that Nancy Farrer knew that arsenic would
kill? No such thing. The real object was, by the introduction of proof that she
had poisoned Mrs. Green, to render it more probable that she it was who
poisoned James Wesley Forrest. And this, I have no doubt, was the whole
effect of the testimony upon the minds of the jury. And here is one of the
greatest dangers of admitting such testimony. Admitted ostensibly to prove a
fact that requires no proof, its effect is to satisfy the jury of the existence of
other facts, to prove which it is confessedly incompetent.
9 7
The most familiar early case holding evidence of other poisonings
inadmissible is People v. Molineux.98 In that prosecution for murder
93. 2 Ohio St. 54 (1853).
94. The defendant did not contest the admissibility of evidence of other uncharged
poisoning deaths with which she was connected.
95. Id. at 71-72.
96. Id. at 72.
97. Id. at 74-75.
98. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
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by poison, evidence of another poisoning was held inadmissible. Other
evidence tended to show that the defendant had sufficient knowledge
of chemistry to have been able to prepare the poison and that the de-
fendant and one of the victims had had some disagreements in the
past. The court held the evidence inadmissible to prove motive, in-
tent, absence of mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, or
identity.99
A more modern example will demonstrate the need for caution in
admitting uncharged misconduct evidence to prove knowledge as an
intermediate fact. In United States v. Shomo,100 the defendant was
charged with being a felon in knowing possession of a firearm, a .38
caliber revolver. At trial, the prosecution permitted the government
to prove that at the time of his arrest, the defendant was in possession
of firearms of different types. The government's theory was that pos-
session of the other weapons demonstrated the defendant's awareness
that it was unlawful to possess a firearm.O1 On appeal, the court first
held that knowledge of unlawfulness is not an element of the crime,
making the evidence inadmissible for that purpose.10 2 Recognizing
this fact, the government changed theories, arguing that the un-
charged misconduct evidence was admissible to prove that the defen-
dant knew the .38 caliber revolver was a firearm. The court rejected
this theory:
Common sense and logic tell us that appellant's possession of a rifle and a
shotgun does nothing to establish that he knew the .38 caliber revolver was a
firearm. Nor does his possession of the ammunition establish such knowl-
edge, in view of the fact that the ammunition was not compatible with the .38
caliber revolver.
It appears from the record that the government tried this case on the the-
ory of "Give a dog an ill name and hang him." As a result, appellant was
subjected to exactly the kind of extreme and unfair prejudice that Rule 404(b)
was intended to prevent. 103
The court reversed, holding that the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.104
99. Id. at 291-303.
100. 786 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 985.
102. Id. In addition, it is difficult to understand how a person's possession of more
items of the same general type demonstrates knowledge of illegality.
103. Id. at 985-86 (quoting Olinger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 234 F.2d
823, 824 (5th Cir. 1956)).
104. Id. at 986. But see United States v. Moore, 97 F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In
Moore the defendant was convicted of possessing an unregistered sawed-off rifle.
The defendant claimed he did not know the weapon was a rifle. The trial court
allowed the prosecution to offer evidence that on the night before the weapon was
found, the defendant was arrested for possession of a semi-automatic rifle. The
appellate court held that admission of the evidence was proper:
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The key lesson to be drawn from these and many other cases
105 is
that a similarity between the charged and uncharged acts of a person
should not signal automatic admission of the evidence. Though the
need for evidence of mental state undeniably exists, courts must exer-
cise caution if the fundamental rule banning character evidence to
prove conduct is to be upheld.
Sometimes, for example, the relevance of uncharged misconduct
evidence on the issue of knowledge either depends upon a forbidden
inference of the actor's propensity or relies on attenuated reasoning
that jurors are unlikely to invoke in place of the more intuitive and
compelling character-based reasoning. These are among the most
problematic cases in applying the "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" rule,
and the courts have hardly reached consensus. In general, the weaker
the circumstantial evidence of knowledge in or from the uncharged
incident, and the less similar the uncharged and charged acts, the
greater the danger that admission of the evidence would violate the
ban on character-based propensity evidence. 10 6 Sometimes, courts
understand the problem created by weak circumstantial links be-
tween uncharged misconduct and the state of mind required in the
charged event. Many courts, however, have shown a particularly
strong tendency toward poorly reasoned decisions in these cases.
After a general analysis of the issue, I will discuss two types of
cases that illustrate this lack of analytical rigor: criminal prosecutions
in which the defendant asserts a "mere presence" defense, 10 7 and
prosecutions for possession of illegal drugs with intent to
distribute.108
The fact that appellant was arrested for possession of a semi-automatic
rifle the night before the sawed-off rifle was discovered was relevant to
his knowledge of guns. This knowledge could be used to negate his pur-
ported mistake of fact.
Id. at 565. This reasoning is valid as long as there was evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant knew the semi-automatic rifle was indeed a
rifle. If not, admission was arguably improper.
105. See, e.g., People v. Schultz-Knighten, 115 N.E. 140, 141 (Ill. 1917) (holding in
prosecution for murder by committing illegal abortion, trial court erred in admit-
ting evidence that the defendant had participated in earlier abortion on another
person when a coroner's inquest concluded that the abortion in that case was
spontaneous rather than induced; "How the jury could infer guilty knowledge or
intent on the part of the [the defendant] from the evidence in the [uncharged
case] unless she was guilty in that case is incomprehensible .... Unless the previ-
ous crime had been committed by her it was no evidence against her.").
106. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 137-80 and accompanying text.
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1. In general
In some cases, the circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
awareness of criminality or wrongdoing is relatively weak. To illus-
trate the problem, return to the vehicle theft hypothetical.109 Suppose
the defendant in the prior (uncharged) instance had not seen X break
into the garage and "hot wire" the vehicle, but had only received the
vehicle from X under somewhat suspicious circumstances. Assume
further that the defendant was not prosecuted in the earlier case, and
did not learn at a later date that the vehicle in this earlier situation
had been stolen. If the defendant received the car described in the
indictment under strikingly similar circumstances, can the jury infer
the defendant's guilty knowledge without employing forbidden reason-
ing? There are at least two ways this might be possible. First, the
jury might infer that the defendant concluded from the circumstances
that the first (uncharged) vehicle was stolen. The jury might then in-
fer that when the defendant obtained a second vehicle from X under
similar circumstances, the defendant knew that the second vehicle
was also stolen.11o The reasoning is as follows:
EVIDENCE: On a prior occasion, the defendant received a stolen
vehicle from X under somewhat suspicious circumstances.
---INFERENCE: From the circumstances, the defendant con-
cluded that the vehicle was stolen.
->CONCLUSION: Having received the second vehicle
from X under similar circumstances, the defendant
concluded that the second vehicle was also stolen.
The second non-character chain of reasoning would be similar, but
subtly different. The jury might infer that even if the defendant did
not conclude from the first incident that the vehicle was stolen, that
when faced with a similar set of circumstances (the charged events),
he or she did develop sufficient suspicion to "know" that both vehicles
were stolen. This "cumulative knowledge" reasoning would be as
follows:
109. For the facts of the hypothetical, see supra note 44 and accompanying text. In
the discussion to follow, we will assume that both vehicles were in fact stolen.
The prosecution of course, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle
in the charged case was stolen. For the uncharged incident to be relevant to the
defendant's knowledge, the jury must also believe that the car in question was
stolen. The Supreme Court has held that this is a question of "conditional rele-
vancy" to be adjudicated according to Rule 104(b). Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1988).
110. Cf. Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170, 173 (Colo. 1962) (holding in prosecution for
larceny by bailee, in which knowledge that goods possessed were stolen is an es-
sential element, evidence that the defendant possessed loot from other burglaries
was admissible to prove knowledge that the goods in question were stolen).
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EVIDENCE: On a prior occasion, the defendant received a stolen
vehicle from X under somewhat suspicious circumstances.
-INFERENCE: From the circumstances, the defendant be-
gan to suspect that the vehicle was stolen.
->CONCLUSION: Having received the second vehicle
from X under very similar circumstances, the defen-
dant concluded that both the first and the second ve-
hicles were stolen.
As long as the jury hews to either of the above chains of reasoning,
the danger that the jury will use the evidence for the forbidden char-
acter purpose is limited. That is, the jury might not find that the de-
fendant knew the vehicle was stolen by employing an inference that
the defendant has a propensity to consort with unsavory characters
who deal in stolen vehicles, nor will the jury convict on the "bad per-
son" reasoning forbidden by the rule. In reality, of course, the tempta-
tion to employ the forbidden reasoning is considerably greater than in
the cases in which the defendant either clearly knew the vehicle being
received from X was stolen, or learned of its nature later but before
receiving the second vehicle from X.
What if the uncharged and charged situations are even less simi-
lar? In general, two types of cases can be hypothesized from our basic
vehicle theft hypothetical."l 1 First, the defendant might have ob-
tained the second vehicle from X under quite different, though suspi-
cious, circumstances. Second, the defendant might have obtained one
of the stolen vehicles from X, and the other from a different source
y.112 Or suppose the defendant had many dealings with the source of
the vehicle that is the subject of the prosecution, and none, save the
one offered by the prosecution, involved wrongdoing. In that situa-
tion, the defendant might have believed firmly that the source ob-
tained the vehicle named in the indictment legally. The fact patterns,
111. We are still assuming that the defendant did not learn after the fact but before
the charged incident that the vehicle was stolen.
112. See, e.g., People v. Lindley, 118 N.E. 719, 720-21 (Ill. 1918) (holding that where
the defendant was charged with larceny and receiving a stolen vehicle, evidence
of the defendant's connection with another stolen vehicle should not have been
admitted where there was no showing that that vehicle was obtained from the
same source or that thefts were otherwise connected); People v. Jacobs, 143
N.Y.S. 21, 22-23 (App. Div. 1913) (holding in trial for burglary, grand larceny,
and receiving stolen goods, trial court committed error in admitting evidence that
the defendant received other stolen property where there was no proof that the
property was taken by the same thief and brought to the same receiver). But see
People v. Marino, 3 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1936) (holding evidence that the defendant,
an automobile dealer, had recently sold several stolen cars under similar circum-
stances, knowing them to be stolen, was admissible to prove the defendant's
knowledge that car at issue was stolen, even though the prosecution offered no
evidence that the prior cars were obtained from the same thief).
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of course, are endlessly variable.113 Though these facts do not destroy
the logical inference of knowledge,114 they do affect the weight of the
evidence and the risk that the jury will misuse the evidence by em-
ploying the forbidden character inference.
Consider the case in which the defendant dealt with the same per-
son on all occasions, but the other events were significantly different
from the charged event. The permitted inference of knowledge in the
charged incident is obviously weaker than it would be if the incidents
were more similar. Merely dealing with the same person on two occa-
sions does not by itself put one on notice that the person should not be
trusted. It is arguably not irrational for a defendant to believe that
the situations are distinct. Nevertheless, if the earlier (uncharged)
situation would have put a reasonable person on guard, a second(though different) suspicious case might cause one to be even more
cautious. The reasoning might be as follows:
EVIDENCE: On a prior occasion, the defendant received a stolen
vehicle from X under somewhat suspicious circumstances.
-4INFERENCE: From the circumstances, the defendant con-
cluded that the vehicle was stolen.
-- CONCLUSION: Having received the second vehicle
from X under different, but also somewhat suspi-
cious circumstances, the defendant concluded that
the second vehicle was also stolen.
Thus, without violating the character rule, the jury could decide that
the defendant knew both vehicles were stolen. Even so, the tempta-
tion to resort to the forbidden character inference is considerably
stronger than in the previous cases. Would a cautionary instruction
prevent the jury from employing the following reasoning?
EVIDENCE: On a prior occasion, the defendant received a stolen
vehicle from X under somewhat suspicious circumstances.
-4INFERENCE: The defendant has a criminal character that
would lead her to associate with unsavory characters
who deal in stolen vehicles.
113. For description of early cases from many jurisdictions, see E.W.H., Annotation,
Admissibility, in Prosecution for Receiving Stolen Property, of Evidence of Trans-
actions Other Than, But Similar to, That Upon Which the Prosecution is Based,for Purpose of Showing Guilty Knowledge or Intent, 105 A.L.R. 1288 (1936).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having "any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence") (emphasis added).
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-->CONCLUSION: The defendant acted in accordance
with her criminal character on the occasion in
question.
It is difficult to imagine a normal jury resisting this logical, though
forbidden reasoning. If the jury knows that both vehicles were stolen,
the forbidden inference is quite attractive, and in many cases, a limit-
ing instruction is unlikely to remove the risk of unfair prejudice.
1 15
Similar reasoning can be used in a case in which the defendant
obtains the two vehicles from two different sources, though both under
suspicious circumstances. If it is a given (or the jury concludes) that
both vehicles were stolen, it is possible to employ non-character rea-
soning to find the defendant's knowledge, but the forbidden character
reasoning will be considerably more compelling in many cases.
Much of the analysis of the stolen vehicle cases can be applied to
illegal drug possession cases as well. If the defendant admits posses-
sion but denies knowing the nature of the substance, evidence of prior
possession of or exposure to the same substance likely would be ad-
missible for the reasons discussed previously. 1 16 Suppose, however,
that the defendant had not previously possessed the substance in
question, but had possessed a different illegal drug.
1 17 Would evi-
dence of the defendant's possession of the other drug be admissible to
prove the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the drug in question?
One might infer that a person who can identify one illegal drug can
identify other illegal drugs, but what generalization supports this in-
ference? If it is the generalization that a person who knowingly pos-
sesses one kind of illegal drug is more likely than a randomly chosen
person to knowingly possess another kind of illegal drug, the reason-
ing relies on a propensity inference, and almost certainly an inference
that violates the character rule. Even if the generalization is simply
that people who know one kind of drug are more likely to have had
experience that gave them information about other kinds of drugs
such that the environment in which those people operate is more
likely to place them in proximity to those substances, this reasoning
as well involves an inference of character-based propensity. Even if it
115. Cf People v. Lindley, 118 N.E. 719, 721 (Ill. 1918). The defendant in Lindley was
charged with larceny and receiving stolen property, an automobile. The trial
court first admitted evidence of another stolen automobile possibly connected
with the defendant, then later ordered the evidence stricken from the record be-
cause of a lack of evidence actually connecting the defendant with the theft. On
appeal of the defendant's conviction, the court held that this was "not a case
where we would be justified in holding that the ruling in striking out the evi-
dence, erroneously admitted, cured the error." Id.
116. See supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
117. For present purposes, it will be assumed that on the uncharged occasion, the de-
fendant knew what the substance was.
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does not, the non-character reasoning is sufficiently tortured that thejury is unlikely to employ it.
Thus, the less similarity between the charged and uncharged acts,
the weaker the inference of knowledge from one to the other, and thegreater the risk that the jury will employ forbidden reasoning. It is in
these types of cases that the kind of caution urged by commentators,
and exhibited by some courts is most needed.
2. Illustration: admissibility to rebut a "mere presence" defense
In some prosecutions, usually those charging simple possession of
illegal drugs or possession for sale of illegal drugs, the defendant as-
serts a "mere presence" type of defense. In United States v. Tomber-
lin,l"8 for example, Tomberlin was charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Police officers discovered
the drugs, as well as items associated with their use, in a room the
defendant occupied in another person's home. To justify conviction,
the prosecution had to prove the defendant knew of and intended to
distribute the drugs.119 To prove the defendant's knowledge of the
presence of the drugs and his intent to distribute, the government in-
troduced evidence of several prior drug-related arrests and convic-
tions, but none involved closely similar facts.120 Nevertheless, the
appellate court affirmed Tomberlin's conviction, holding that the evi-
dence was admissible to prove both knowledge and intent.121
The court did not explain precisely how this use of the evidence
evaded the character rule, and it almost certainly does not do so. The
relevance of the prior arrests and convictions most clearly derives
from an inference that a person who has been involved with drugs on
several other occasions is more likely than one not so involved to have
known that illegal drugs (of another kind) were in a room he occupied.
It is difficult to understand how an inference that people who possessillegal drugs will tend to continue to do so is not character-based.
Even if one can draw a non-character inference, the less intuitive rea-
soning behind such a theory is certain to be overwhelmed by the more
intuitive, but forbidden, reasoning.12 2 In cases in which the un-
charged misconduct differs substantially from the conduct at issue,
118. 130 F.3d 1318 (8th Cir. 1997).
119. Id. at 1319.
120. None of the prior cases involved discovery of drugs in a room Tomberlin occupied,
and none involved methamphetamine. At most, the cases were similar in that in
each, the defendant was found either trying to dispose of drugs or escaping from a
place where drugs were found. See id. at 1320.
121. Id. at 1320-21. See also United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995)(similar); United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318 (8th Cir. 1995) (similar).
122. Despite this danger, the court in Tomberlin refused to hold that the probative
value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. 130 F.3d at 1321.
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the argument for admissibility to rebut the "mere presence" defense is
even more difficult to justify.123
Other cases in which the defendant claims not to have known
about the presence of the drug have been better reasoned. In United
States v. Wilson, 124 for example, the defendant was charged with,
among other crimes, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
The defendant allegedly dealt cocaine from a residence; a police search
revealed cocaine hidden in the yard outside the home. The defendant
claimed he did not possess the cocaine in the yard. For the prosecu-
tion to prevail, it was necessary to prove that the defendant knew of
the presence of the cocaine. 125 At trial, to prove the defendant's
knowledge, the court permitted the prosecution to present evidence of
123. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1998). In Davis, the de-
fendant was charged with various crimes relating to possession and distribution
of crack cocaine and aiding and abetting use or carrying of a firearm in connec-
tion with those crimes. The court held that evidence of the defendant's prior ar-
rest for possession of a firearm was admissible to rebut the defendant's "mere
presence" defense, even though the uncharged conduct was factually different
from the defendant's act of escorting a firearm-carrying alleged co-defendant to a
hotel room containing drugs. The court held the evidence relevant to the defen-
dant's knowledge of the nature of the activities in the hotel room. Id. at 779-80.
The decision is difficult to justify. The defendant's prior firearm possession oc-
curred under very different circumstances. That situation did not involve drugs,
the firearm was different, and it involved none of the alleged co-conspirators from
the current case. Prior possession of a concealed firearm under these circum-
stances appears to say little if anything about the defendant's knowledge of drug
activity in the present case. See also United States v. Edwards, 91 F.3d 1101,
1103-04 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecution for aiding and abetting possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, evidence that one year earlier, the defendant had been arrested fol-
lowing a search of his home that uncovered evidence of drug dealing was admissi-
ble to rebut the defendant's "mere presence" defense by showing the defendant's
knowledge and intent; though the defendant was arrested on the charged occa-
sion with some of the same types of items as in the earlier case, the circum-
stances of the charged case were otherwise quite dissimilar); United States v.
Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 830-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding in prosecution involving
crack cocaine conspiracy, evidence of the earlier conviction of one of the defend-
ants for cocaine delivery was admissible to rebut his "mere presence" defense; the
evidence "tends to refute his story that he was merely 'in the wrong place at the
wrong time,' and makes it more probable that he had the requisite 'state of mind'
or 'intent' to participate in the present cocaine-related offenses"); United States v.
Santa Cruz, 48 F.3d 1118, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding in prosecution for
possession of 165.4 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute, evidence that sev-
eral months earlier, the defendant had been arrested for drunk driving and pos-
sessing one gram of cocaine was admissible to prove knowledge; "Santa-Cruz's
prior act made his knowledge of his charged offense more probable. It occurred
just 12 weeks earlier. It served to rebut his argument that 'he had not knowingly
participated in the drug transaction and that his possession of the cocaine was
accidental."').
124. 107 F.3d 774 (10th Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 784.
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a prior conviction for cocaine possession arising from an incident in
which the substance was found on the defendant's person when police
stopped his car. While recognizing that prior narcotics involvement
can be admissible when close in time to the charged occasion, highly
probative, and involved similar circumstances as those of the charged
occasion,l 2 6 the court noted the dissimilarity of the facts of the prior
case, and held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence:
[T]he underlying circumstances of these two events are so factually dissimilar
that evidence of the prior conviction provides little, if any, probative value in
assessing whether Mr. Wilson violated § 841(a)(1). Mr. Wilson's prior convic-
tion arose from cocaine and marijuana found on his person after a vehicle
stop[;] the present case involves the distribution of cocaine from a residence.
Although there is a relationship between a person's possession of cocaine and
his or her knowledge of the substance itself, such fact taken alone does little to
support an inference that Mr. Wilson either possessed, knew he possessed, or
intended to distribute the cocaine found at 2026 North Green.127
The court also held that the evidence was "highly prejudicial" because
it "tends to incriminate Mr. Wilson's character and portray him as adrug user, who thus is likely to be the individual who sold cocaine at
2026 North Green."128 The trial court thus erred in admitting the
evidence.129
The Wilson court's analysis of the relevance and probative value of
the prior drug activity, together with its prejudicial effect, is notable
for its clarity. By holding that the evidence invited exactly the type ofinference forbidden by the character rule, the court protected that rule
even while recognizing that the evidence could be admissible if the
circumstances of the charged and uncharged events are sufficiently
similar.
United States v. Robinson130 illustrates a situation in which the
similarity of the charged and uncharged incidents provides the level ofprobative value that justifies admission. The defendant was charged
with conspiracy to distribute and possession of cocaine base with in-
tent to distribute. Robinson had two prior arrests for possession of
cocaine base in amounts suitable for distribution. The trial court held
the evidence admissible to rebut the "mere presence" defense and
show knowledge and intent. The appellate court affirmed.131 In
Robinson, the uncharged misconduct evidence involved the same ille-
gal substance and similar illegal behavior, and the incidents were suf-ficiently close in time. Though the danger of unfair prejudice
126. Id. at 785.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court held, however, that the error was harmless. Id. at 785-86.
130. 110 F.3d 1320 (8th Cir. 1997).
131. Id. at 1324-25.
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obviously looms, the greater probative value of the evidence justified
the court's ruling admitting the evidence.
132
Admissibility of uncharged misconduct to rebut a "mere presence"
defense is not confined to drug cases. For example, a prosecution for
being a felon in possession of a firearm generally requires proof that
the defendant possessed the firearm knowingly. In some cases, courts
have admitted evidence of the defendant's prior use of a firearm to
prove the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the firearm on the
charged occasion. 13 3 Where the timing of the charged and uncharged
acts or other circumstances strongly suggest the defendant's knowl-
edge on the charged occasion, admission of the evidence is justifiable.
In United States v. Chesney,13 4 for example, the defendant was ar-
rested while riding as a passenger in a vehicle that contained a fire-
arm. Just five days earlier, the defendant had participated in a
robbery using a firearm of similar description. This evidence strongly
suggested that the defendant was aware of the firearm's presence in
the vehicle, and thus his knowing possession.13 5 As the court pointed
out, it would not be proper to infer the defendant's knowledge merely
from the presence of the firearm in the vehicle;
136 the evidence con-
necting the defendant to a firearm-likely the same firearm-was
132. See also United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing in prosecution for aiding and abetting distribution of crack cocaine, evidence
of similar conduct eight months after charged offense was admissible to rebut
claim that the defendant was a mere bystander); United States v. Gregory, 74
F.3d 819, 822 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecution for distribution of cocaine
and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, evidence of the defendant's frequent crack
cocaine use with witness, including the day of one the charged transactions, was
admissible to prove the defendant knew that narcotics were stored at his house,
that he associated himself with its storage, and that he was familiar with com-
mercial possibilities of trading in cocaine; evidence thus tended to prove the de-
fendant's intent to commit crimes); United States v. Lau, 828 F.2d 871, 873-74
(1st Cir. 1987) (holding in prosecution for importing and possessing cocaine and
conspiracy to do so where the defendants claimed they were unaware that suit-
cases they carried in their helicopter contained cocaine, evidence that more than
two years earlier, the defendants had been involved in shipping cocaine in boxes
in an airplane was admissible to prove knowledge). The Lau court wrote: "The
fact that Lau and Taylor were knowledgeable about cocaine, that they probably
knew first hand what it weighed and had some sense of how it was smuggled,
suggests that Lau ... might have become suspicious (if he in fact were innocent)
after he was asked to take several heavy suitcases on his helicopter and to make
false statement to the St. Croix customs officer. As 'knowledgeable,' Lau's appar-
ent lack of suspicion makes an innocent explanation of his actions (and hence of
his partner Taylor's actions) less plausible." Id.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding in
prosecution for being felon in possession of firearm, evidence of the defendant's
participation in a robbery using a firearm was admissible to prove the defendant
knowingly possessed the gun).
134. 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 572.
136. Id.
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needed to demonstrate his knowledge. Of course, a person's mere pos-
session of a firearm on an uncharged occasion, without more, has no
meaningful tendency to prove the defendant knew of the presence of
the firearm on the charged occasion. Only when facts are presentlinking the two events in time, circumstances, or other respects, is it
appropriate to admit the evidence to rebut a defense of lack of
knowledge.
3. Illustration: admissibility to prove unlawful intent in
prosecutions for possession of illegal drugs with intent
to distribute
Though weak judicial analysis of the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct to prove knowledge can be found in many types of
cases, 1 37 it is perhaps most commonly represented in drug-related
prosecutions, particularly those charging possession of illegal drugs
with intent to distribute.138 The courts have liberally admitted evi-dence of the defendant's other drug activities for many purposes, in-
cluding knowledge, intent, absence of mistake, motive, and to prove
the context of the crime charged.139 When courts admit evidence of
uncharged misconduct to prove knowledge, that fact is often an inter-
mediate inference in a chain of inferences leading to intent. In some
cases, evidence of prior use, possession, or perhaps sale of one type ofillegal drug has been admitted to prove knowledge and intent to pos-
sess a different type of drug for sale. In other cases, courts have per-
mitted the prosecution to prove that the defendant charged with
possession with intent to sell a particular drug had, at another time,
used, possessed, or sold the same drug. In still other cases, the defen-
137. See, e.g., United States v. Grissom, 44 F.3d 1507 (10th Cir. 1995). Grissom was aprosecution for making false statements to a federally insured financial institu-
tion. The defendant denied intentionally making false statements. On appeal,
the court found no error in the trial court's ruling allowing the prosecution to
offer evidence that the defendant had falsified union payroll records in an unre-lated matter. The court held that the evidence was "highly probative" of the de-
fendant's intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. Id. at 1513. The court held
that the evidence "rendered more probable the fact that defendant knowingly
submitted false records to the bank." Id. Responding to the defendant's argu-
ment that the incidents were too dissimilar, the court held that "[tihe similarity
Rule 404(b) requires is not so strict." Id. The court also held that the evidence
was not too prejudicial to warrant its admission. Id. at 1514.
138. Generally, these are prosecutions for narcotics trafficking, often including a con-
spiracy count.
139. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Admissibility, under Rule 404(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, of Evidence of Accused's Prior Use of Illegal Drugs in Pros-
ecution for Conspiracy to Distribute Such Drugs, 114 A.L.R. Fed. 511 (1993 &Supp. 1998) (reviewing purposes for which evidence of prior drug use has been
admitted in prosecutions for conspiracy to distribute drugs).
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dant's prior or subsequent sale of the same drug is offered to prove
knowledge of the nature of the substance, and thus intent.
Sometimes, courts employ a kitchen sink approach to admission of
the uncharged misconduct evidence, listing knowledge among a num-
ber of other purposes, but without analysis of how knowledge is rele-
vant to criminal intent. 140 When admission of the evidence can be
justified under theories other than knowledge, the flaw in mentioning
knowledge as a permissible purpose for admission, while not entirely
excusable, is not acute. In United States v. Conway,14 1 for example,
the defendant was convicted of knowing and intentional possession of
controlled substances. On appeal, the court approved the trial court's
admission of evidence of similar uncharged conduct. Because of its
similarity to the conduct at issue, the evidence was justifiably admit-
ted to prove intent by means of a common plan to possess and dis-
tribute cocaine from motels located on the same street.142 The court,
however, also held the evidence admissible to prove "knowledge, in-
tent, and absence of mistake or accident."143 It is unclear how the
evidence should have been admitted to prove the defendant's knowl-
edge, particularly when the defendant's defense was not based on a
claim that he did not know the nature of the substance he possessed.
Rather, the defendant simply denied owning the seized cocaine.'
44
When knowledge-to-intent is the primary theory for admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence, the problem is considerably more se-
rious. The key question is how these cases can be justified, consistent
with the ban on character evidence. Consider first the prosecutions
for possession with intent to sell of one type of drug where the court
permits evidence that the defendant had possessed (sometimes for
sale) a different kind of drug. In United States v. Benitez-Meraz,
14 5
the defendant was prosecuted for possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute. The trial court permitted the government to
present evidence that the defendant previously had possessed another
140. Others have criticized this list approach to admissibility of uncharged misconduct
evidence. Wright and Graham state: "Particularly to be deplored is what might
be called the 'smorgasbord' approach to analysis of other crimes evidence in
which the court simply serves up a long list of permissible uses without any at-
tempt to show how any of them are applicable to the case at hand." 22 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5240, at 479 (citing cases).
141. 73 F.3d 975 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 980-81.
143. Id. at 981.
144. See also State v. Cameron, 349 S.E.2d 327, 331-32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
in prosecution for incest with stepdaughter, evidence of prior sexual contact with
stepdaughter was admissible to prove "knowledge, opportunity, intent, and plan";
however, it was unclear how the evidence tended to prove knowledge or how
knowledge was an issue in the case).
145. 161 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1998).
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drug, cocaine, for distribution.146 On appeal, the court affirmed the
defendant's conviction. The court explained:
Because the testimony connected Meraz to possession and distribution of co-
caine, it was directly relevant to the issue of his knowledge and intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamine in this case .... The cocaine transactions took
place during the same time period as the alleged methamphetamine transac-
tions, and two independent witnesses testified to witnessing cocaine transac-
tions. The district court could reasonably find that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect.147
If the evidence of the defendant's prior possession of another illegal
drug was not admissible to demonstrate a character-based propensity
to possess for sale a different drug, by what reasoning is it relevant to
prove the defendant's "knowledge and intent to distribute?" Possibly,
the reasoning is as follows:
EVIDENCE: On another occasion, the defendant possessed co-
caine for distribution.
->INFERENCE: The defendant knew what cocaine looked
like.
-AINFERENCE: The defendant knew what metham-
phetamine looked like.
-->CONCLUSION: The defendant intended to pos-
sess methamphetamine for distribution. 148
146. Id. at 1165-66.
147. Id. at 1166. See also United States v. Tomberlin, 130 F.3d 1318, 1319-21 (8th Cir.
1997), discussed supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text, (holding in prosecu-
tion for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute where the de-
fendant denied knowing about the methamphetamine found in a room he
occupied, evidence of the defendant's prior drug convictions was admissible to
prove knowledge and intent despite the fact that none of the prior convictions
involved the same drug or arose under closely similar circumstances; at most, in
those cases the defendant had either tried to dispose of the drugs or was found
fleeing from the place where the drugs were located); United States v. Broussard,
80 F.3d 1025, 1039-1040 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecution alleging partici-
pation in cocaine trafficking operation, evidence that one defendant had been
convicted of conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and
another had been convicted of possession of marijuana was admissible to prove
knowledge of drug conspiracy and intent to participate in it; citing with approval
a decision noting that in drug cases, extrinsic drug offense evidence is frequently
admissible); United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-ing in prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture designer drug similar to heroin,
where the defendant allegedly hired pharmacologist to manufacture drug, evi-
dence that the defendant had prior conviction for possession of heroin with intent
to distribute was admissible to prove "knowledge and intent").
148. The applicability of this reasoning assumes that when the court wrote of admissi-
bility to prove "knowledge and intent to distribute," it meant both rather than
either one. If the court meant the evidence was admissible to prove either knowl-
edge or intent in such cases, the intent theory would be somewhat easier to
identify.
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If this is roughly the theory, it does differ somewhat from the forbid-
den character reasoning, which would be as follows:
EVIDENCE: On another occasion, the defendant possessed co-
caine for distribution.
-->INFERENCE: The defendant is the type of person who pos-
sesses and distributes illegal narcotics.
->CONCLUSION: The defendant possessed the metham-
phetamine with intent to distribute.
How different is the reasoning apparently approved in Benitez-
Meraz from the forbidden logic, however? To assess this question, one
must first recognize that the court's reasoning clearly involves infer-
ences based on propensity. That is, this theory relies on the fact-
finder's willingness to accept the proposition that a person who had
possessed one illegal drug for distribution would possess another ille-
gal drug for that purpose. But why would this be true? Most logically,
it would be true because of the generalization that a person who sells
one illegal substance is more likely to possess another illegal drug for
sale than is a person randomly chosen from the population. This is
certainly an inference based on propensity. Of course, the evidence
rule does not forbid all propensity inferences, but only those based on
character. 149 The issue, then, is whether this is a character-based
propensity inference.
One might describe this theory as based on a non-character-based
propensity inference. Sometimes, people come to know or understand
something as a result of knowing or understanding something else.
For example, a person who knows something about six-panel wooden
doors is likely to know something about four-panel wooden doors or
even about flat, hollow doors. Perhaps more to the point, one would
expect a headache sufferer who knows about one type of pain reliever
to know about other types of pain relievers. In neither of these cases
does the inference of knowledge depend on a judgment of the person's
character.
In the same vein, one might expect a person who has had knowing
contact with one type of illegal drug to have had knowing contact with
other types of illegal drugs; it simply seems natural to infer that being
around one substance of that type increases the likelihood of being
around others. In some cases, the inference can be quite compelling.
Unlike the case of the person who knows about different types of doors
or the headache sufferer, however, the illegal drug case raises a signif-
icant danger. There is nothing morally wrong with knowing about
doors or suffering headaches, but most would agree that one who sells
illegal drugs has a bad character that would lead that person to deal
149. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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in other illegal drugs. Indeed, this type of inference is far more attrac-
tive and intuitive than the strained morally neutral inference that
might be permitted under the evidence rules. How successful is a jury
instruction limiting the use of the evidence to its less intuitive purpose
likely to be?150 Though one cannot be certain, it is reasonable to as-
sume that such an instruction would do little or no good, despite the
normal "presumption" that juries follow their instructions.15i
All too often in cases of this type, appellate courts refuse to find
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the uncharged
misconduct evidence. Indeed, some courts affirm with little or no
analysis.152 It is not unusual, for example, to read conclusory lan-
guage stating simply that prior drug activities are more probative
than prejudicial on the question of proving knowledge.153
Of course, there are some circumstances in which the probative
value of prior drug activities does constitute significant proof of knowl-
edge. Where, for example, the present activity requires detailed
knowledge of a complex process, and the uncharged activity tends to
demonstrate such knowledge, the probative value of the evidence can
be great. In addition, the danger that the jury will misuse the evi-
dence might not be as great because the permissible purpose is easier
to comprehend. The flaw in the cases considered here is that there is
nothing compelling about the inference of knowledge from the un-
charged conduct, and the danger of jury misuse of the evidence is
acute.
The second fact pattern involves the prior possession of the same
illegal drug in a prosecution for possession of the drug with intent to
distribute, and is even more troubling. In United States v. Logan,154
for example, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute
heroin and methamphetamine, and possession of the substances with
150. The court in Benitez-Meraz exhibited enormous faith in jury instructions, writing
that "any such prejudice was minimized by the district court's instructions to thejury that it could consider the cocaine testimony only to evaluate Meraz' intent or
knowledge and not to determine his guilt or innocence." 161 F.3d at 1166.
151. For discussion of this "presumption," see supra note 9.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding in
prosecution for conspiracy to import with intent to distribute cocaine and for pos-
session of cocaine, evidence of a conviction for possessing narcotics with intent to
distribute was admissible to prove "knowledge and intent"; simply noting that
the prior conviction concerned an event less than a year before the charged event
and that the offense was "similar").
153. See, e.g., United States v. Cortinas, 142 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding in
prosecution for conspiracy and other offenses arising from a marijuana distribu-
tion scheme, evidence of the defendant's prior participation in purchases of
methamphetamine in resale quantities was admissible to prove knowledge or in-
tent to traffick in marijuana; stating, "we previously have held that 'proof of prior
drug activities is more probative than prejudicial'" (quoting United States v. Har-
ris, 932 F.2d 1529, 1534 (5th Cir. 1991)).
154. 121 F.3d 1172 (8th Cir. 1997).
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intent to distribute. At trial, the government was permitted to intro-
duce evidence that on one occasion in the past, the defendant had been
arrested for possession of methamphetamine for personal use (the ar-
resting officer deemed the amount the defendant possessed to be too
small to break up and sell). 155 On appeal, the defendant argued that,
because his prior possession had been in an amount consistent with
personal use, the evidence was not relevant to the charged crimes, and
even if relevant, it should have been excluded because it was unfairly
prejudicial. The court held that admission of this evidence was not
error.15 6 After stating that the evidence was not admissible to prove
the defendant's character or propensity to commit the crimes, the
court wrote:
[E]vidence of prior possession of drugs, even in an amount consistent only
with personal use, is admissible to show such things as knowledge and intent
of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute drugs is an
element .... This is so even if the defendant has not raised a defense based on
lack of knowledge or lack of intent.
1 5 7
The court also noted that the trial judge instructed the jury not to use
the evidence to prove the defendant carried out the charged acts, but
that if other evidence convinced the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt
that he did so, they could "use this evidence concerning previous acts
to decide intent, knowledge, or common scheme or plan."15s
155. Id. at 1177-78.
156. Id. at 1178.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting trial court jury instruction). See also United States v. Manning, 79
F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding in prosecution for, inter alia, possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, evidence of prior cocaine dealing was admissible
to prove knowledge and intent; stating that "[t]he evidence that Manning had
previously sold cocaine makes it more likely both that he was aware of the con-
tents of the plastic bags in the briefcase and that he intended to distribute the
two bags of cocaine"); United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 942-43 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding in prosecution for, inter alia, possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and conspiracy to do same, evidence of the defendant's previous arrest
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was admissible to prove intent
to possess and that the defendant's participation in conspiracy was knowing;
stressing that the same court had previously held that evidence of prior drug
involvement is appropriate to show plan, motive, or intent in drug trafficking
cases); United States v. Cheramie, 51 F.3d 538, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding in
prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, evidence of the
defendant's prior cocaine sales to government informant was "relevant to prove
his knowledge and intent" without explaining the court's reasoning); United
States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding in prosecution for conspir-
acy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamines, trial court did not err in
admitting evidence that the defendant had used cocaine with an alleged co-con-
spirator and evidence was admissible to show the defendant's knowledge of the
nature of the activities he supported and that the people using his property were
involved with these substances); United States v. Maceo, 947 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding in prosecution for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, trial court did
not err in admitting evidence that the defendant, who had performed legal ser-
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Once again, it is important to attempt to distinguish the reasoning
permitted by the court from the forbidden character logic. Clearly, thejury was only to use the uncharged misconduct evidence to determine
whether the defendant possessed the required mental state for the
charged crimes, but how the evidence tends to establish that element
is not apparent. This is particularly true if, as the court states, this
theory can be applied even where the defendant does not base a de-
fense on lack of knowledge or intent. Perhaps the permissible reason-
ing is approximately as follows:
EVIDENCE: On another occasion, the defendant possessed meth-
amphetamine for personal use.
-*INFERENCE: The defendant knew what methampheta-
mine was.
-CONCLUSION: The defendant intended to possess
methamphetamine for purposes of distribution. 159
As with the first type of case, this reasoning does not avoid infer-
ences based on propensity. That is, this theory relies on the fact-
finder's willingness to accept the proposition that a person who had
possessed methamphetamine for personal use would also possess it for
sale. It is difficult to imagine this inferential step supported by any
generalization other than that a person who has had contact with an
illegal substance is more likely to sell it (if possessed in sufficient
quantity) than is a person randomly chosen from the population. This
is forbidden character reasoning. Unless one can imagine a non-char-
acter reason why such a person would act in that way, the evidence
should be excluded. Courts approving admission based on this theory
do so at risk of eviscerating the character ban in drug prosecutions.
Occasionally, courts recognize the risks of admission on this type of
theory. In United States v. Mejia-Uribe,160 for example, the defendant
was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and
traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote unlawful ac-
tivities. The prosecution was permitted to present evidence of the de-
fendant's conviction more than fifteen years earlier of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute, purportedly to prove knowl-
edge and intent. On appeal, this was held to be error. The court
wrote:
Here, although both crimes involved the distribution of cocaine, the 1978 con-
viction involved a single sale of cocaine to undercover agents. In contrast, this
vices for other the defendants, had used cocaine because evidence tended to show
that the defendant knew about and knowingly participated in conspiracy).
159. As with the first example, it is assumed that knowledge is a part of the reasoning
toward the ultimate fact of intent.
160. 75 F.3d 395 (8th Cir. 1996).
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case involved a large scale, ongoing operation.... Uribe's crimes [were] ... not
similar in kind or reasonably close in time to the instant charges.
1 6 1
The court also held that the old conviction evidence was more prejudi-
cial than probative. In particular, the conviction "offered little, if any,
probative value beyond the tendency to show that Uribe was the type
of person with a propensity to commit this type of crime."16 2 Though
the court held the error harmless, 16 3 its willingness to challenge the
position that other drug dealing activities are admissible in prosecu-
tions for the same general type of activity is refreshing.
Another well-reasoned decision is United States v. Arias-Mon-
toya.16 4 The defendant was charged with knowingly and intentionally
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. The drugs were found in
the trunk of a borrowed car the defendant was driving. At trial, the
defendant did not deny the presence of the cocaine in the trunk, but
claimed that he did not know it was there. To prove knowledge, and
thus intent to possess, the prosecution offered evidence of a ten-year-
old conviction for cocaine possession. The trial court admitted the evi-
dence. The defendant was convicted and appealed, claiming the court
erred in admitting this evidence. The court of appeals agreed with the
defendant:
[W]e fail to see how the defendant's conviction for possessing twenty-eight
grams of cocaine in Texas nearly ten years ago has any "special" relevance to
his knowledge of the contents of the trunk of the car he was driving in Febru-
ary, 1991. To be sure, we have often deemed prior drug-related bad acts ad-
missible to negate a "no knowledge" defense on a subsequent drug charge. ...
[H]owever, we have only done so where the evidence at issue supported at
least one permissible (i.e., non-character-based) inference concerning the de-
fendant's state of mind at the time of the charged offense.
[The trial] court attempted to articulate a permissible basis for admitting
Arias Montoya's past conviction into evidence: "The question is ... [whether]
one can infer that a defendant who has a past conviction of drug related crime
as in this case is more likely to have cocaine in a package form in his automo-
bile than those-more likely to have cocaine in that package form in his auto-
mobile? It's a close question." This formulation strikes us as wholly
propensity-based. It asks, in essence, whether someone having possessed ille-
gal drugs in the past would be more likely to possess with the intent to dis-
tribute them at a later time than someone without such a record.
Moreover, the trial court's inquiry seems irrelevant to any fact in issue at
trial. Arias-Montoya did not deny that "cocaine in a package form" was in the
trunk of the car he was driving. Rather, he claimed not to know it. Under
these circumstances, the relevant test would appear to be whether someone
with a past conviction for possessing twenty-eight grams of cocaine is more
161. Id. at 398.
162. Id. at 399.
163. Id. The court held that the government's case, including evidence showing the
defendant's knowledge and intent to participate in the conspiracy, was "over-
whelming." Id.
164. 967 F.2d 708 (1st Cir. 1992).
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likely to know that there is a kilogram of cocaine in the trunk of the borrowed
car he is driving than someone with no prior conviction.
The only connection we can draw between the defendant's prior conviction
and his state of mind at the time of the Rhode Island arrest is one based on
character, i.e., the defendant was more likely to know cocaine was in the car
because he previously possessed cocaine. As we have explained, while bad
character evidence may, indeed, be probative of a defendant's guilty knowl-
edge, it must be suppressed unless it supports at least one non-character
based inference.
No such inference is possible here. There was no evidence connecting the
defendant to the trunk of the car that would make the added fact of his past
possession relevant to his knowledge on the instant charge. The record does
not show, and the government did not argue, that the defendant had ever
opened or had reason to open the trunk of the car. None of his belongings was
found there. And, though there were fingerprints on the cocaine package, the
defendant's were not among them.
Framing the 404(b) question in more ominous terms only underscores the
point. We might ask, for example, whether an unemployed illegal alien, driv-
ing a borrowed car containing an electronic pager and cellular phone, who lies
to police officers about his identity and has an eight year old conviction for
possessing a small amount of cocaine, is more likely to know that a kilogram
of cocaine is hidden in the trunk of the car than one with no such prior convic-
tion. Although we might answer "yes," our response would be based solely on
character inferences ....
Had the car belonged to the defendant, or were there evidence that he had
used it for an extended period of time or on more than one occasion, we might
be willing to presume he would have had reason to open its trunk and, so, to
know that a kilogram of cocaine was hidden there. Arguably, the fact of the
defendant's prior possession coupled with his access to and use of the trunk
would make it more likely for him to have come across the cocaine or recog-
nized the cavity in the trunk as a good place to hide it.165
165. Id. at 710-712. In its discussion, the court distinguished several cases in which it
previously had held that the admission of the evidence was proper:
In United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1990) .... the
defendant was observed driving a car to a corner where he met co-de-
fendants. The defendant exited the car and drove away in a pickup
truck. Co-defendants drove the car to a shopping center and consum-
mated a drug sale to government agents. At the shopping center, the
agents found two bags containing cocaine on the floor of the car next to
the driver's seat where the defendant had been sitting. The defendant
and co-defendants were charged with possessing (with intent to dis-
tribute) cocaine.
At trial the defendant argued, among other things, that he was una-
ware of the cocaine when he turned the car over to co-defendants. To
negate this defense, the district court admitted into evidence the defen-
dant's two three-year-old convictions for possessing (with intent to dis-
tribute) marijuana and cocaine. This court sustained that decision. We
reasoned that "[s]ince one who has previous experience with drugs is
more likely ... to recognize (and hence to know) that the bags' contents
were drugs than one without such experience, the inferences at issue
do not involve character," id. at 138. "[T]he fact that a juror might
also make other inferences that do involve character is beside the point
as far as Rule 404's absolute ban is concerned." Id. The evidence will
"survive[ ] an absolute ban as long as at least one permissible inference
is possible." Id.
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The Arias-Montoya court's analysis is entirely correct; the defen-
dant's mere possession of the same drug many years earlier, without
more, does not tend to show his knowledge that drugs were in the
trunk of a car he was driving on the charged occasion.
Finally, there are cases in which another sale of the same illegal
drug is offered as evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the nature
of the drug, and thus the intent required for the crime. A simple ex-
ample is People v. Mejia,166 where the defendant was charged with
dispensing a dangerous drug (LSD). The defendant made the sale to
two undercover officers after offering to sell them "thirteen 'hits' of
'acid." ' 16 7 At trial, the defendant denied knowing that the pills were
LSD. To prove "intent, knowledge and identity,"168 the court permit-
ted the prosecution to offer evidence that the day after the sale, the
defendant sold more LSD to the same officers. On appeal, the court
held that admission of this evidence was not error because the evi-
dence was relevant to prove the defendant's knowledge and intent.
The court did not elaborate further except to state that the trial court
issued a cautionary instruction.' 69
The Mejia decision and cases employing similar reasoning in other
contexts are perhaps the most troubling. Another sale of the same
substance near in time to the charged sale does not demonstrate
knowledge unless evidence was offered to show that the defendant
knew what the substance was on the uncharged occasion. No such
In United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1982), federal agents
found illegal drugs, including marijuana, under a chicken coop in a barn
and under some dog food in a freezer room of the farmhouse where the
defendant lived with his wife (the owner). At trial, the defendant
claimed not to have known of the drugs' presence. By introducing evi-
dence of the defendant's prior conviction for marijuana possession, the
government sought to have the jury infer that "one who lives on a farm
with marijuana in the freezer room and under the chicken coop and has
a prior possession conviction is more likely to know about the presence of
marijuana than one who lives on such a farm and does not have a past
possession conviction." Id. at 63.
We affirmed the admission of this evidence, finding it possessed "spe-
cial," non-character-based relevance. The jury might have concluded, we
suggested, that those who use and keep marijuana nearby are more
likely to talk freely about it in front of one with a prior conviction for
possessing marijuana; that "a past possessor is more likely to spot mari-
juana under a chicken coop;" and that "a past possessor is less likely to
throw away marijuana if he comes across it," id. These inferences sup-
port a conclusion of knowledge, we found, and "[n]one ... depends en-
tirely upon the 'bad character/propensity' chain of reasoning." Id.
Id. at 710-11. Despite holding that admission of the evidence was error, the court
held that the error was harmless. Id. at 714.
166. 534 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1975).
167. Id. at 780.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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evidence was offered. It is most unlikely that a cautionary instruction
would prevent the jury from employing the most obvious chain of rea-
soning to the uncharged misconduct evidence: that the defendant is a
drug dealer. This is the forbidden character reasoning. Though
flawed, the Meija court's reasoning has been applied in a variety of
contexts in addition to drug-related prosecutions. In a prosecution for
sexual assault on a child, for example, evidence that the defendant
had engaged in similar behavior with the same victim has been held
admissible to prove "motive and guilty knowledge" where those facts
were disputed.170
Still, in some contexts, it is easier to justify admission of evidence
of the defendant's involvement in sales of the same drug on the knowl-
edge-to-intent theory. In United States v. Poole,171 for example, the
defendant was charged with sale of cocaine in his restaurant. To un-
dermine the defendant's assertion that he was unaware that cocaine
was being bought and sold in his restaurant and that he did not intend
to engage in such a sale, the court permitted the prosecution to offer
evidence of many previous occasions in which the defendant had par-
ticipated in sales of cocaine at that location. On appeal, the court
found no error in the trial court's ruling. The court stressed that the
evidence was admitted solely to prove the defendant's knowledge and
intent, that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the trial court
issued a limiting instruction to the jury.17 2 The decision in Poole can
be justified on the ground that the knowledge-to-intent theory is both
logical and clear. In this case, it probably is not difficult for the jury to
understand the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted,
and though there is always a danger that the jury will ignore the lim-
iting instruction and convict the defendant because of his propensity
to deal drugs, the trial court acted well within its authority to deter-
mine that the probative value of the evidence on the knowledge-to-
intent theory was not substantially outweighed by that danger. 173
170. People v. Holder, 687 P.2d 462, 463 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). While holding that the
evidence was admissible for this purpose, the court overturned the defendant's
conviction because the court's limiting instructions failed to inform the jury ade-
quately about the limited purpose for which the evidence could be considered. Id.
at 463-64.
171. 929 F.2d 1476 (lCth Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 1480-82.
173. See also United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1572-73 (8th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing in prosecution for various drug related charges arising from an intricate ma-
rijuana importation and distribution network, evidence that the defendant
previously had been involved in a very similar operation involving conduct identi-
cal to some of the acts alleged was admissible to prove, inter alia, knowledge
about and intent to join the conspiracy, and knowledge of marijuana smuggling in
general); United States v. Rackstraw, 7 F.3d 1476, 1479-80 (10th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing in prosecution arising from seizure of cocaine from a cooler in the trunk of the
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Admission of uncharged misconduct under this type of reasoning can
also be justified in other contexts.' 7 4
As already discussed, some appellate courts reviewing narcotics
convictions have shown considerable concern for the avoidance of un-
fair prejudice and have found error in trial courts' admission of un-
charged misconduct evidence on the knowledge-to-intent theory.175
Though it does not neatly fit into the categories of drug cases dis-
cussed here, another case deserves mention. In United States v. Viz-
carra-Martinez,176 the defendant was charged with wrongful
possession of and conspiracy to wrongfully possess a listed chemical
knowing and having reasonable cause to believe it would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. The defendant denied knowing that
the chemical would be used for that purpose. The trial court permit-
ted the government to offer evidence that at the time of his arrest, the
defendant was found in possession of a small amount of metham-
phetamine for personal use.
On appeal, the court reversed the defendant's conviction. After re-
jecting the government's theory that the evidence did not constitute
uncharged misconduct but was an inextricably intertwined part of the
charged offense, 1 77 the court held that the evidence also was inadmis-
sible other crimes evidence. The court agreed with the defendant's ar-
gument that his possession of personal-use methamphetamine "[did]
not tend to prove that he was aware that the chemicals he was deliver-
defendant's car, evidence that the defendant had engaged in cocaine sales involv-
ing the same other individuals, close in time to the events in question, was admis-
sible to prove knowledge of the distribution scheme and thus intent to participate
in it, and the evidence countered the defendant's claim that he did not know that
the cooler contained cocaine); cf. United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 942-44
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding in prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, evidence that the defendant had previously been arrested for posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute was admissible to show the defendant's
knowledge of drug conspiracy and thus intent to participate in it where trial court
determined that probative value of evidence was not substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, and issued limiting instruction). This reasoning can
also be applicable in the context of other types of crimes. Cf. United States v.
Andonian, 29 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition) (holding in
money laundering prosecution in which conspirators used an elaborate scheme,
evidence that the defendant participated in an identical scheme was admissible
to prove knowledge and intent).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing in prosecution for receiving child pornography where the defendant claimed
he received the computer images by mistake, evidence of other similar images
also found at the same time on his computer was admissible to prove lack of acci-
dent and that the defendant knew the nature of the material he was receiving).
175. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
176. 66 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).
177. Id. at 1012-13.
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ing would be used to manufacture methamphetamine or that he in-
tended to participate in a conspiracy to do so."178 The court wrote:
Here, there exists no logical connection between the knowledge that the defen-
dant might have gained by using methamphetamine and the knowledge that
the government must prove that he possessed at the time of his arrest-that
is, knowledge of the use to which the hydriotic acid in his possession would be
put as well as knowledge of the scope and purpose of the conspiracy.
We conclude that evidence of possession of a small quantity of drugs does
not tend to prove that a defendant is aware of the use to which a particular
chemical in his possession will be put-more specifically, that possession of a
small amount of methamphetamine for personal use does not tend to prove
that Vizcarra-Martinez was aware that hydriotic acid could be transformed
into methamphetamine through a complicated manufacturing process. View-
ing the case from "common human experience," it is clear that most people
who use drugs-indeed, most people who use legal chemical substances, such
as cleaning fluid or paint or medicine-do so without having the faintest idea
as to how the substance is produced or what ingredients are required to man-
ufacture it.179
The court held that the trial court's error in admitting the evidence
was not harmless, and reversed the conviction.' 8 0
In taking a more cautious approach, decisions such as that in Viz-
carra-Martinez offer greater protection for the rule forbidding the use
of character evidence to prove action in conformity. Not only was the
court willing to scrutinize carefully the trial judge's action, but it also
recognized the extent of harm that might be caused by the jury's con-
sideration of the uncharged misconduct evidence.
C. Fact Patterns in which the Relevance of the Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence Depends on "Doctrine of
Chances" Reasoning
Aside from the chains of reasoning set forth above, another type of
reasoning sometimes can be used to justify the admission of un-
charged misconduct evidence to prove knowledge. Though not always
labeled as such, this theory is often called the "doctrine of chances."
As applied to the proof of knowledge, the theory is rather intuitive; it
operates by virtue of the assumption that the facts of the uncharged
incident or incidents, together with those of the charged crime, make
an innocent state of mind highly unlikely. The doctrine of chances
theory in this context has been embraced by a large number of
courtsl 8 ' and commentators.18 2
178. Id. at 1014.
179. Id. at 1014-15 (quoting United State v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108
(9th Cir. 1979)). The court also held that the character evidence ban required
exclusion of evidence that the defendant possessed or used methamphetamine to
prove that he participated in a conspiracy to manufacture it. Id. at 1015-16.
180. Id. at 1016-17.
181. See, e.g., Luery v. State, 81 A. 681, 682 (Md. 1911) (adopting this theory without
using the label in prosecution for receiving stolen goods, stating: "It might very
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Applying the doctrine of chances theory to prove knowledge that
goods possessed by the defendant were stolen, Wigmore explained:
The reasoning of this argument ... is that the recurrence of a like act lessens
by each instance the possibility that a given instance could be the result of
inadvertence, accident, or other innocent intent. Accordingly, the argument
here is that the oftener A is found in possession of stolen goods, the less likely
it is that his possession on the occasion charged was innocent. It is not a
question of specifically proving knowledge; it is merely a question of the im-
probability of an innocent intent. 1 8
3
There is an important difference between this type of reasoning and
the logic of the theories discussed previously. In those theories, the
evidence was specifically directed at proving that one or a series of
similar instances gave notice to the defendant of the stolen nature of
the goods. Under the doctrine of chances theory, by contrast, "[Ilt is
the mere fact of the repeated possession of other stolen goods that les-
sens the chances of innocence."1s 4 Or, as another commentator ex-
plains, this theory proceeds on "the assumption [of] the improbability
of repeated innocent acts of the same character," rather than on an
"affirmative showing of notice" from the uncharged incidents.185
The reasoning of the doctrine of chances theory avoids the forbid-
den character-based logic, and thus is permissible under current law.
'It is founded on a logical inference deriving not from the personal
characteristics of the actor, but from the external circumstances them-
selves. The inference is based on informal probability reasoning-rea-
well happen that one would innocently purchase a cake of solder or other article
without having any reason to suspect it had been stolen, but a number of such
sales at about one-half of the value of the article, especially if made by an em-
ployee of the company which used it, ought to suggest to any one that there was
something wrong"); State v. Zeman, 226 P. 465 (Utah 1924) (similar; quoting
Wigmore though not using the label "doctrine of chances"). One commentator
states, "The vast majority of courts apply the doctrine of chances to proof of
knowledge and treat the doctrine as a viable noncharacter theory of logical rele-
vance." 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 5.28, at 5-80.
182. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKERLRIED, supra note 6, § 5.28, at 5-80; 2 WIGMORE, supra note
56, § 325; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5245 (noting theory but also
cautioning of danger of jury misuse of evidence); C.R. Williams, The Problem of
Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 295 (1979).
183. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 325, at 287. Wigmore called this method of proving
knowledge in possession of stolen goods cases the "intent principle." Id. Another
author explains the doctrine of chances theory as applied to proof of knowledge as
follows:
The reasoning underlying the .. .theory is that it is unlikely that the
defendant would be repeatedly innocently involved in the similar suspi-
cious situations. Innocent persons occasionally become enmeshed in sus-
picious circumstances, but that occurs rarely. When the defendant
receives stolen goods often enough, the probability is that sooner or later
the true owner or the police may contact the defendant.
1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 5.28, at 5-78 to 5-79.
184. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 325, at 287.
185. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 5.28, at 5-79.
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soning that does not require formal statistical proof, but only the
jury's subjective evaluation of likelihood based on intuition and com-
mon experience. And in many cases, the intuitive assessment is
rather compelling. Could it really be true that a person has received
so many stolen vehicles without realizing-at any point-that they
were stolen? It is thus possible for one's mind to travel from the evi-
dence to the conclusion without relying on forbidden character reason-
ing or on the assumption that prior experience would have given the
defendant notice of the stolen nature of vehicles obtained from a par-
ticular source or under similar circumstances.
Assuming that the issue in the vehicle theft hypotheticalS6 re-
mains the defendant's knowledge that the vehicle in question was sto-
len, the doctrine of chances theory would proceed as follows:
EVIDENCE: On one or more prior occasions, the defendant re-
ceived vehicles that proved to be stolen.
-INFERENCE: The defendant became aware that she was
receiving stolen vehicles.
-- CONCLUSION: The defendant knew the vehicle
charged in the indictment was stolen.
To avoid forbidden character reasoning, the chain probably relies on
the generalization that it is highly unlikely a person would innocently
receive a stolen vehicle on more than one occasion. As one commenta-
tor has written of a hypothetical in which a person charged with
knowing possession of heroin in his automobile's trunk claims lack of
knowledge, "it would be relevant to prove that he had been found in
possession of heroin on other occasions. While innocent persons occa-
sionally become enmeshed in suspicious circumstances, a person's re-
current involvement in such situations is implausible and probative of
mens rea."187 The greater the number of uncharged instances, the
smaller the likelihood of innocence. Doctrine of chances reasoning
does not involve an inference of knowledge on one occasion from proof
of knowledge on one or more prior occasions. Rather, each occasion
lessens the likelihood of innocent knowledge in each other occasion.
Logically, this theory is valid, and it is different from the other ad-
missibility routes that have been discussed so far. As Wigmore
pointed out, under the doctrine of chances theory,
(1) It is immaterial whether in the other instances a knowing possession is
shown. It is the mere fact of the repeated possession of other stolen goods that
lessens the chances of innocence. (2) It is immaterial that the other goods
were similar in kind to those charged, or were received from the same person.
186. For the basic facts of the hypothetical, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
187. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Use of the Doctrine of Chances as
Theory of Admissibility For Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REV.
73, 82 (1993).
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On the contrary, the greater the variety of the goods and of the sources they
came from, the more striking the coincidence, and the more difficult to believe
that the explanation is an innocent one. (3) It is immaterial whether the other
possessions occurred before or after the possession charged; it is the multipli-
cation of instances that affects our belief, and not the time of their occur-
rence-provided the time is not so distant as to be accountable for on theory of
chance acquisition.
1 8 8
The most obvious application of the doctrine of chances theory is in
cases where the uncharged and the charged incidents are very similar,
and intuitively inconsistent with innocence. Thus, one might reason
that a person who receives stolen farm tractors under similar circum-
stances on a number of occasions is unlikely to be oblivious to the fact
that they were stolen.18 9 It does not matter whether the uncharged
incidents took place before or after the charged incident; the inference
applies in either case. 190 The greater the number of similar incidents,
the stronger the inference of knowledge.
One advantage of the doctrine of chances theory is that it does not
apply only to cases in which there is remarkable similarity between
the uncharged and the charged acts. To return to the vehicle theft
hypothetical, suppose the only similarity between the uncharged inci-
dent and the charged incident is that in both cases, the vehicles were
stolen.19 1 Otherwise, the facts are different. The defendant might
have obtained the two vehicles from different sources, or from the
same source but under quite different circumstances. If the defense is
based on lack of knowledge that the vehicle mentioned in the indict-
ment was stolen, the doctrine of chances theory might be used.19 2
This theory would ask the fact-finder to evaluate, intuitively, how
likely it is that the same person would be on the receiving end of two
stolen vehicles without knowing that either was stolen. As the num-
ber of instances (even if quite different factually) increases, the infer-
ence becomes even more compelling. How likely is it that the same
188. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 325, at 287.
189. See United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying "the
hypothesis that it is unlikely that repetitive involvement in criminal conduct will
leave a defendant oblivious to the character of the acts in question").
190. In Estabrook, for example, the uncharged acts took place within a few months
after the charged crime. Id. at 287.
191. This fact could be conceded by the defendant, or if not, the jury could conclude,
following the court's determination that there is evidence sufficient to support
the finding, that both vehicles were stolen.
192. See State v. Zeman, 226 P. 465 (Utah 1924). In that prosecution for receiving
stolen goods, evidence that the defendant had received other stolen goods was
admissible to prove knowledge even though (1) some of the other goods had been
stolen before the theft at issue while other goods had been stolen later; (2) there
was no proof that the defendant knew the other goods had been stolen; (3) the
other goods were stolen from different merchants; and (4) the defendant received
the other goods from a different source. Quoting Wigmore, the court found these
facts immaterial and allowed the jury to consider the evidence on the question of
the defendant's knowledge. Id. at 466-67.
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person would receive ten stolen vehicles in a relatively short period of
time without knowing that these vehicles were stolen?193
Courts often employ doctrine of chances reasoning without labeling
it as such, suggesting that the theory is probably far more ubiquitous
in the cases than might appear at first. In United States v. Evans,194
for example, the defendant was charged with several crimes relating
to receiving stolen vehicles that had crossed state lines, and with
fraudulently altering vehicle identification numbers. To prove the de-
fendant's knowledge that the vehicles were stolen, the prosecution of-
fered evidence of the defendant's possession of five other stolen
vehicles, as well as fraudulent inspection affidavits and materials
used for retagging the vehicles. The court held that "[tihe evidence of
the other stolen cars established Evans' knowledge as to the character
of the stolen vehicles charged in ... the indictment and his intent in
possessing them."19 5 Because the court nowhere stated that the de-
fendant knew the five other vehicles were stolen, the theory on which
the evidence was admitted appears to have been the doctrine of
chances: How likely is it that the defendant would possess so many
stolen vehicles (as well as paraphernalia for concealing their stolen
nature) and not be aware that they were stolen? One commentator, in
fact, classes the case as an example of the use of the doctrine of
chances to prove knowledge.196
In 1935, Learned Hand also applied this theory in a stolen vehicles
case without using the term "doctrine of chances." In that opinion, he
held explicitly that for the uncharged misconduct evidence to be ad-
missible to prove knowledge, the prosecution need not prove that the
defendant knew the uncharged vehicles were stolen.197
193. In State v. Cohen, 162 S.W. 216 (Mo. 1913), the defendant was charged with re-
ceiving stolen property. At trial, the court admitted evidence that the defendant
received other stolen goods from the same source as many as 500 times, and that
the price he paid for the goods was low. Affirming the defendant's conviction, the
court wrote: "A person might innocently receive stolen property on one occasion,
yet such instances, so similar in character, could not be multiplied to any great
extent and the receiver's mind be left free from all trace of suspicion which would
most likely develop into a mature guilty knowledge." Id. at 221.
When I teach the doctrine of chances to my Evidence students, I sometimes
liken the idea to one's reaction to a series of cases, "What are the odds?!"
194. 27 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 1232.
196. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 5.28, at 5-78 & n.2.
197. United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1935). In reaching this conclusion,
Hand rejected some English and American authority to the contrary, holding that
"[t]he judge must decide each time whether the other instance or instances form a
basis for sound inference as to the guilty knowledge of the accused in the transac-
tion under inquiry." Id. at 606. For analysis of this theory, see Marshall McK-
usick, Techniques in Proof of Other Crimes to Show Guilty Knowledge and Intent,
24 IowA L. REV. 471, 476-77 (1939), which supports Hand's position.
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Of course, that the doctrine of chances theory has logical validity
does not mean that whenever it applies to any extent, the uncharged
misconduct evidence will be admissible. The same facts used to sup-
port the doctrine of chances inference also lend themselves to forbid-
den character reasoning, and intuitively, the latter is often con-
siderably more attractive than the former. How likely is it that a jury
will focus on the informal probabilistic theory when it is so easy to
infer, simply, that the defendant is the kind of person who engages in
serial receipt of stolen goods? Indeed, some of the very factors that
make the doctrine of chances theory more compelling (number of un-
charged instances, for example) tend to make the character reasoning
all but irresistible. If the court concludes that the legitimate probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger that
the jury will use the evidence improperly to the prejudice of the defen-
dant, the court should exclude the evidence entirely. At the very least,
the court should caution the jury concerning the limited admissibility
of the evidence so as to reduce the potential prejudice to an acceptable
level.19 8 Nevertheless, the doctrine of chances provides an acceptable
route to admission of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove
knowledge.
III. ADMISSIBILITY TO PROVE KNOWLEDGE AS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF AN ULTIMATE
FACT OTHER THAN A REQUIRED STATE
OF MIND
Although a person's knowledge is usually relevant to prove a re-
quired mental state, knowledge can sometimes be logically relevant to
prove a different ultimate fact such as the identity of the person who
committed the act at issue in the case. It is not possible, of course, to
set forth all situations in which evidence of knowledge could be used
in this fashion; indeed, whenever a person's knowledge of a fact is rel-
evant to an issue, and the person gained such knowledge through mis-
conduct, evidence of that misconduct is potentially admissible. A few
examples will demonstrate the point. As will appear from the exam-
ples, when used in this fashion the "knowledge" purpose for offering
uncharged misconduct sometimes overlaps with certain other ac-
cepted and familiar purposes, particularly "opportunity."
In one type of case, uncharged misconduct evidence might show
that a person possesses relatively uncommon knowledge of a thing,
technique, or method, and such knowledge makes it somewhat more
likely that the person committed the act in question. Suppose, for ex-
ample, a defendant is charged with participation in a sophisticated
198. For discussion of the general methodology of ruling on admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence, see supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
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illegal drug importation scheme. If the defendant denies involvement,
evidence that he or she was involved in a similar schemel99 at another
time would tend to show that the defendant possessed the necessary
knowledge to commit that crime. Although the evidence is relevant
for the impermissible purpose of demonstrating the defendant's crimi-
nal character (and thus the possibility that the defendant committed
the crime), it is also relevant to prove the defendant's participation in
the crime because the defendant knew how to commit it. The reason-
ing is as follows:
EVIDENCE: On another occasion, the defendant participated in a
complex scheme to import illegal drugs similar to the scheme
alleged in the present case.
->INFERENCE: The defendant knew how to conduct such a
scheme, placing her in the group of people who could
have committed the crime.
->CONCLUSION: The defendant committed the crime.
The same logic would apply to cases in which conduct demonstrating
knowledge of one aspect of an illegal operation is offered to prove
knowledge of another aspect of that operation. 200 This theory can be
applied to any type of fact pattern in which uncharged misconduct
tends to show the kind of knowledge that is needed for guilt in the
charged event.2 0
199. In some circumstances, it is not even necessary for the two incidents to be closely
similar. If, for example, the defendant is charged with robbing a bank using a
sophisticated explosive device to open the safe, evidence that the defendant had
used a similar device in a completely different context would be relevant to show
knowledge, and thus place the defendant in the class of persons who could have
committed the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th
Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen the evidence of other acts is offered to prove knowledge, the
other acts need not be similar to the charged acts as long as they 'tend to make
the existence of the defendant's knowledge more probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."' (quoting United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir.
1994))).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1998)(holding in prosecution for, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, evidence of~the defendant's prior participation in conspiracy
to manufacture methamphetamine was admissible to prove the defendant's
knowledge regarding distribution of the drug).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding in
prosecution for mail and wire fraud arising from telemarketing scheme falsely
promising victims recovery of funds lost in other telemarketing frauds in return
for payment of a retainer fee, evidence of the defendant's prior employment with
another telemarketing company was admissible to prove the defendant's knowl-
edge of the fraudulent nature of charged scheme). In United States v. Barrett,
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976), a prosecution arising from theft, interstate transpor-
tation, and disposal of stolen postage stamps, theft was accomplished by bypas-
sing of alarm system. The court held that evidence of the defendant's expertise
with alarm systems was admissible to prove knowledge:
[Vol. 81:115
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Considered in this way, admission of the evidence does not violate
the character evidence rule. The reasoning does not involve a judg-
ment about the defendant's moral character, and thus does not re-
quire an inference that the defendant acted in accordance with the
character trait so revealed. It does not avoid all propensity inferences,
however. For the evidence to be probative of the defendant's conduct,
it is necessary to infer that people who possess such knowledge (as
demonstrated by their behavior) are likely to use the knowledge on
more than one occasion. If the logic is followed by the fact-finder, how-
ever, the character rule is not violated because this inference is based
on a morally neutral judgment concerning the defendant rather than
one based on the defendant's character. 20 2 A person who knows how
to drive a car, for example, will have a tendency to use that knowl-
edge, regardless of the person's character.
Of course, it is precisely because the uncharged conduct in most
cases of this type is not morally neutral that problems of the kind the
character rule is designed to prevent may still arise. The danger of
prejudice, in other words, is still present, and sometimes looms suffi-
ciently large to justify-or even require-exclusion. Thus, admission
should not be automatic. The trial court must determine whether the
probative value of the evidence is slight when compared with the dan-
gers it creates (most commonly the danger that the jury will misuse
the evidence causing unfair prejudice). If so, the court should exclude
the evidence.
In cases of this type, courts more often characterize the evidence as
offered to prove "opportunity" or "modus operandi" rather than iden-
tity. The label is not as important as the theory; in these cases, the
evidence is not barred by the character rule.
Knowledge of a fact-proven by other misconduct-can also be
used for other purposes, such as to support the applicability of a sub-
stantive rule to the case. Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems 20 3 pro-
vides a instructive example. The plaintiff sued her employer under
the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging sexual harass-
ment by Fellows, one of her supervisors. Prior authority had estab-
One of the stamp burglars had to have sufficient knowledge of the intri-
cacies of burglar alarm systems to locate the alarm wires, which were
mingled with other wires inside a telephone cable, and to loop them off.
The ordinary person or even burglar would be unlikely to possess the
skill to do this. Where the bypassing of the alarm was so distinctive a
feature of the stamp burglar, evidence that Barrett had expertise with
alarms, while not by itself conclusive of guilt, reinforced the evidence
that linked him to the burglary, and thereby to the crimes charged.
Id. at 248.
202. Earlier, I applied a similar analysis to a non-character-based propensity infer-
ence as part of a chain of reasoning leading to a required mental state. See supra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
203. 16 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Ct. App. 1993).
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lished that the employer's liability for sexual harassment by one of its
supervisors is strict; there is no requirement that the employer know
of the behavior.204 At trial, the plaintiff offered evidence of Fellows'
sexual misconduct with other female employees. In one case, for ex-
ample, Fellows' superiors received an anonymous letter claiming he
was carrying on an affair with his executive assistant. 2 05 The trial
court admitted the evidence over the defendant's objection, and the
ruling was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the evidence was
admissible to support the award of punitive damages,206 presumably
on the theory that failing to take steps against Fellows while knowing
of his actions supported not only compensation, but also punishment.
Admission of the evidence in Bihun appears to be justified. Al-
though the risk exists that the jury will award damages based on
claims not the subject of the plaintiffs action, their admission is a
practical necessity if the case is to be removed from the realm of negli-
gence (for which punitive damages generally may not be awarded) and
placed in the realm of recklessness (which would justify punitive
damages).207
A party's knowledge of a fact can also be relevant to whether that
party's conduct was actionable. In Orjias v. Stevenson,208 for example,
Colorado plaintiffs brought an action for negligence and nuisance
against a waferboard manufacturer, alleging that its plant emitted
unlawful levels of air pollutants and chemical wastes as well as noise
and light. The court permitted the plaintiff to present evidence of six
air quality violations at the defendant's Wisconsin plant. The evi-
dence was admissible to prove the defendant's notice or knowledge
that it would not be able to comply with Colorado's air quality regula-
tions. Knowledge, in turn, was relevant to the willfulness of the de-
fendant's conduct as well as to its negligence.209
204. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp, 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851 n.6 (Ct. App.
1989).
205. Bihun, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
206. Id. at 792, 794. The evidence was also admissible to support plaintiffs underly-
ing claim. Plaintiff alleged that Fellows proposed having an affair and told her
that if she consented, she could have any job she wanted. The court held that
information about the affair between Fellows and his executive assistant "could
reasonably be taken by Ms. Bihun as indicating Fellows meant what he said
about getting her any job she wanted if she would have sex with him. Such infor-
mation could also reasonably suggest the opposite result if she refused." Id. at
792. This, in turn, would support both quid pro quo and hostile work environ-
ment liability. Id.
207. The Bijun court also held that evidence of the supervisor's other sexual miscon-
duct was admissible to prove his character as an ultimate fact disputed in the
action. Id. at 794.
208. 31 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 1994).
209. Id. at 999-1002.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A person's state of mind cannot be perceived directly. It must al-
ways be inferred. As a result, whenever a particular mental state is
an element of, or is relevant to, a charge or claim, the party seeking to
establish that mental state must resort to circumstantial evidence. If
the circumstances of the event at issue supply a basis for an inference
of the mental state, proof of those circumstances is rarely objectiona-
ble. But when proof of a particular mental state on one occasion is
supplied by evidence of the same mental state on another occasion,
and when that other occasion involved conduct that reflects adversely
on the actor's character, a significant issue of admissibility arises.
The court must determine whether the risks associated with the evi-
dence outweigh its probative value.
In some situations the probative value of uncharged misconduct
evidence on the issue of the actor's knowledge is relatively great, while
the risk of unfair prejudice from the fact-finder's misuse of uncharged
misconduct evidence is comparatively small. In those situations, ad-
mission of the evidence, along with a limiting instruction, serves the
goal of truth-determination that is so central to the trial. 210 In other
cases, the risk that the evidence will be used improperly 2 11 is simply
too great to tolerate, and the court should exclude the evidence.
If we are to continue to take seriously the rule barring proof of guilt
or liability by character, it is essential that courts carefully scrutinize
all uncharged misconduct evidence. All too often, courts have failed to
do so when uncharged misconduct is offered to prove an actor's mental
state such as knowledge. It is easy to understand the temptation to
admit such evidence in light of the difficulty of proving that which
cannot be observed directly, but given the potentially devastating con-
sequences of trials, particularly criminal trials, a fair system of justice
requires no less.
210. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (requiring the courts to construe the evidence rules "to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined") (em-
phasis added).
211. In this context, "improperly" actually has two meanings. First, the jury might
over-value the uncharged misconduct evidence as proof of the mental state. The
unfair prejudice involved in this situation has been called "inferential error
prejudice." See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
717, 720 (1998). Second, the jury might ignore the actual charges before the court
and punish the defendant for the uncharged misconduct. This type of evidence
has been called "nullification prejudice." Id.
20021
